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READY, STEADY, GO: TOYOTA’S ADVERTISING IN AMERICA, 1958-1979. 
by 
REBECCA HOPE SMITH 
(Under the Direction of Craig Roell) 
ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the marketing strategy of Toyota Motor 
Corporation in America and place these strategies into their historical context.  The 
advertisements will ultimately tie in with trends inside the United States, as well as the 
development of the company as an international business. 
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 Some fifty years ago, it was inconceivable for most Americans to imagine owning 
a Japanese vehicle, for at that time, Americans considered Japanese products to be cheap 
and not to their standards.  In 1958 Albert E. Birt, the president of Manhattan’s Hambro 
Automotive Corporation believed that the import sales would never top 300,000.1  In 
2004, Toyota sold over 400,000 Camry models alone, a far cry from the president’s 
estimate of 300,000.  Today, it is hard to imagine the mindset of those people, especially 
with the proliferation of Japanese products in most households, small appliances and 
consumer electronics such as televisions, VCRs, DVD players, stereos, and of course 
automobiles.  Japanese vehicles often outsell American vehicles, and many out perform 
them as well.  What caused this change in the industry?  How did the Japanese 
manufacturing and advertising influence the market?  How much of a role did the oil 
crises of the 1970s play in this change?   
These questions are applicable to all Japanese automobile companies, including 
the Toyota Motor Company.  As a case study, it is interesting to follow the development 
of Toyota to draw these conclusions.  How did Toyota make the transition from a 
manufacturer of weaving machinery to producing automobiles?  What conditions led to 
Toyota becoming the world’s second largest manufacturer, producing more than 5.5 
million vehicles each year?2  How did their products become so valuable and desirable 
that they frequently appear on the list of cars most often stolen?3   
                                                 
1 Time, March 31, 1958, p. 76 
2 Information found at the Toyota Motor Corporation’s Website, at 
http://www.toyota.co.jp/en/about_toyota/history  The figures refer to both unit and net sales. 
3 For 2002, National Insurance Crime Bureau states that the Toyota Camry is the most frequently stolen car 
in the US, with the Toyota Corolla at number ten.  Similarly, the Honda Accord and Honda Civic are 





More specifically, I hope to address some of the following questions directly.  
How did Toyota manage to rise from a small company that produced mainly trucks to 
one of the top automobile companies in the world?  How did the company gain a foothold 
in America?  What types of advertisements did Toyota use to draw in the early 
customers?  Was there a specific age group in mind with some of the advertisements?  
Did Toyota (or other manufacturers) attempt to address their foreignness, or did they 
instead focus on other aspects, such as price or quality?  How did Toyota attempt to set 
itself apart from the competitors?  What were some of the advantages that Toyota 
highlighted in their ads?  How did Toyota design and promote its image as an attractive 
alternative available to American consumers?  How could a Japanese icon become so 
American? 
Toyota is an interesting case study because of the unique conditions the company 
faced.  One of the most influential features of the story was the fact that the company did 
not have direct aid, either monetary or otherwise, from a foreign company.  For example, 
Nissan, Toyota’s closest competitor in Japan, had tie-ins with Aston Martin, a British 
manufacturer.  While Toyota studied other companies, learning directly from Ford, they 
never had direct ties with any foreign manufacturers.  Toyota also quickly emerged as an 
industry leader after the end of World War II, and managed to stay on top of the Japanese 
market from the 1960s to the present.  Indeed, Toyota was the first Japanese automobile 
company to debut its vehicles in the United States, all imported, of course, until the 
building of the first American plant in the 1980s. 
Because advertising can serve as an effective window through which to view 




focus on how such ads changed to fit current trends and events.  Advertisements, 
especially for automobiles, change to fit the growing demands and concerns of the world 
market.  So, for example, during a time of high gas prices, companies will seek to 
highlight fuel efficiency.  In other periods, the same companies may emphasize the 
amount of legroom, or the horsepower, or the price of their vehicles.  With increasing 
worries about the environment, some companies like to emphasize meeting strict 
standards.  Technological advances in product design as well as strategic, effective 
marketing campaigns are the two-edged swords in successful market penetration. 
The most important practice for the development of Toyota was the successful 
marketing campaigns in Japan and the United States.  Toyota used slogans and terms that 
promoted features of their cars, such as fuel-efficiency or durability.  The company first 
focused its attention on showing ads in the local markets before jumping to national 
media.  By using a variety of media, including television, magazines, and newspapers, 
Toyota guaranteed a large audience.  One of their vehicles was even featured in the 1967 
James Bond film You Only Live Twice.  Their strategic advertising campaigns effectively 
enabled Toyota to counter any negative misconceptions about their products.  It also 
helped to introduce people to the vehicles, as well as their popular features and strengths.  
Toyota used a number of memorable slogans in their ads such as “Get your hands on a 
Toyota and you’ll never let go” and the signature Toyota jump4, with which the company 
worked to entice consumers to purchase one or more of their available products.  Again, 
technology and marketing worked hand-in-hand in creating interest, which would 
hopefully result in a test drive.  This technology would also make an excellent form of 
                                                 
4 The Toyota jump was common in advertisements from the 1980s and 1990s.  They featured a person in 




marketing through the envied product reliability record.  These methods would allow new 
owners to justify and identify with their wise purchase, and hopefully eliminate any 
feelings of “buyers remorse.” 
Nearly all of the writings on Toyota, or the Japanese automobile industry in 
general, come from recent years.  Since the development of the automobile industry is a 
fairly new area of historical study, the number of works about these companies is limited.  
One of the first trends in writing about the industry developed to attempt to explain to 
American executives the different techniques employed by the Japanese companies.  
Many of these works focused on such themes as quality control and why the Toyota 
system was especially popular.  Others looked at the Japanese style of management, or 
the working environment. 
Another string of writings were memoirs by important people in the history of the 
company.  For Toyota, these included founders Eiji Toyoda and Shotaro Kamiya.  The 
Toyota Motor Corporation even released a few books to the public, some as general 
histories and another as a long pamphlet.  Some people inside the company also 
published works describing their systems, such as the famous kanban5 and the Toyota 
suggestion box. 
There are a few works, both articles and books, which look at the Japanese 
automobile industry in general.  These works typically take a statistical approach to 
comparing the Japanese industry with the American one.  Other documents examine a 
specific problem or part of the industry and compare it with other companies.  These texts 
                                                 





tend to include a number of charts and tables, but often obscure the reasons why the 
numbers differ from year to year. 
One of the most monumental of these works is Michael Cusumano’s The 
Japanese Automobile Industry: Technology and Management at Nissan and Toyota.  
Published in 1985, this book, replete with charts, graphs, and tables, examines the history 
and rise of Nissan and Toyota.  Yet, while Cusumano compares and contrasts the 
vehicles, types of vehicles, numbers sold, and more, he does not examine advertising and 
makes little reference to some of the historical events that shaped the direction of the 
company and industry. 
Wanda James’ Driving from Japan: Japanese Cars in America is an excellent 
survey of the major Japanese companies, as well as some of the minor ones.  Because it is 
relatively new, published in 2005, it covers the newer trends that the older works could 
not discuss.  The book details the companies’ development in Japan, and then their move 
to the U.S.  The work is excellent in providing general information as well as details 
about the vehicles, along with awards each vehicle won.  In some cases James even 
discusses changes in the culture and the world situation.  Nonetheless, there is very little 
mention of advertising, nor any detailed analysis for why these cars changed or 
experienced increases in sales, especially in the early years. 
Indeed, given the historically significant role of strategic advertising, it is curious 
how little attention has been paid to the actual advertisements and the way that the 
company targeted specific segments of the population.  While some of the memoirs or 




work focusing on the advertisements and their influence in popular culture, or how 
contemporary events changed the ways the companies advertised. 
Some might argue that advertising is not a valuable field to study, and would 
instead point to topics such as the components of the vehicles, fuel efficiency, or even the 
Japanese system of management.  However, other authors have already covered these 
topics in great detail.  Yet, none has attempted to analyze the advertising specifically.  If, 
as critics would argue, advertising does not influence the consumer, then why would 
companies such as Toyota continue to pour money into these means?  By the time Toyota 
attempted to break into the American market, other manufacturers, both domestic and 
foreign, already dominated the market.  Without advertising, how else would Toyota 
inform the consumers about their new alternatives? 
 Advertising history is also valuable as it allows the author to weave several 
different stories into one, in hopes of presenting a picture that is more clear than a simple 
business history.  Advertising is tuned in to the numerous trends of the culture, and the 
companies must tap into these trends to succeed in the market.  The growth of a company 
can also be shown through their ads, as the more money a company makes the more they 
can spend on advertising.  Their growth may also be evident in the phrasing of their ads, 
and can include numbers sold in previous years, or set them apart from close competitors.  
Advertisements are also important, because as consumers, we can all relate to 
advertisements.  People can often recall some of the jingles or images that permeate 
television, magazines and radio.  In fact, most consumers can recall slogans and jingles 




The history of advertising is as young a field as the history of the automobile 
industry.  Advertising in the United States did not begin to develop in any modern sense 
until the 1920s, long before the Toyoda family was even making vehicles.  By the time 
Toyota reached America, the television was just beginning to be a major feature in 
American households.  Print advertisements were still important, and cheaper to make.   
Advertising and marketing are subfields of the larger area of consumer culture, 
but can stand alone in their own right.  As per Dr. Craig Roell, there are at least eight 
main schools of interpretation of consumer culture.  The first school is the oldest, and is 
the basis for much of the work done in business schools and seminars.  Two of the most 
influential works from this school come from the “Father of Public Relations,” Edward L. 
Bernays.  In both Crystallizing Public Opinion (1923) and Propaganda (1928)6, Bernays 
sought to explain how to create effective advertisements to establish a consumer base.  
Recent works, such as The 22 Immutable Laws of Branding7 seek to offer training and 
advice to companies searching for a way to expand their business.  A second school is the 
great man (or woman) theory.  This school celebrates the people who contributed to the 
growth of the advertising industry.  The most influential work from this school is Stephen 
Fox’s The Mirror Makers: A History of American Advertising and Its Creators (1984). 
 The apologetics school emphasizes the role of consumers as participants in 
advertising rather than simple victims.  James B. Twitchell is the most outspoken 
advocate in this subject.  Even the titles of his books display his optimism in 
consumerism: Adcult USA: The Triumph of Advertising in American Culture (1996), 
                                                 
6 Edward L. Bernays, Crystallizing Public Opinion (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1923), Propaganda 
(New York: Liveright, 1928). 
7 Al Ries and Laura Ries, The 22 Immutable Laws of Branding: How to Build a Product or Service into a 




Lead Us Into Temptation: The Triumph of American Materialism (1999), Living It Up: 
Our Love Affair with Luxury (2002) and Twenty Ads That Shook the World: The 
Century’s Most Groundbreaking Advertising and How It Changed Us All (2000).8  
Contrastingly, the conspiracy school, often following the ideas of Karl Marx and 
Thornstein Veblen, stresses the role of advertising in creating consumers to buy the goods 
created in the industrial system.  The main proponent of this field, Stuart Ewen9, argues 
that advertising serves to keep people tied to the industrial system.  Wilson Bryan Key’s 
controversial work, Subliminal Seduction: Ad Media’s Manipulation of a Not So Innocent 
America (1973)10, presented the use of subliminal messages in advertising. 
Along the same line of thought, the realist/activist school presents evidence of 
marketers and advertising taking advantage of the consumer.  This school often promotes 
activism, and is headed by Juliet Schor.11  The victim/feminist school places emphasis on 
those that make consumers victims, with special focus on women.  Both Jean Kilbourne’s 
Deadly Persuasion: The Addictive Power of Advertising (1999) and Naomi Wolf’s The 
Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women (1991)12 fit into this 
school.  The textual/image analysis camp sees advertising as manipulative and wants to 
                                                 
8 James B. Twitchell, Adcult USA: The Triumph of Advertising in American Culture (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996), Lead Us Into Temptation: The Triumph of American Materialism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1999), Living It Up: Our Love Affair with Luxury (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2002), Twenty Ads That Shook the World: The Century’s Most Groundbreaking 
Advertising and How It Changed Us All (New York: Crown Publishing Group, 2000). 
9 PR! A Social History of Spin (New York: Basic Books, 1996), All Consuming Images: The Politics of 
Style in Contemporary Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1988), Captains of Consciousness: Advertising 
and the Social Roots of the Consumer Culture (McGraw-Hill, 1976, 25th anniversary edition with new 
introduction by the author, New York: Basic Books, 2001). 
10 Wilson Bryan Key, Subliminal Seduction: Ad Media’s Manipulation of a Not So Innocent America 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1973). 
11 Born to Boy: The Commercialized Child and the New Consumer Culture (Scribner: 2004), The 
Overspent American: Why We Want What We Don’t Need (New York: Basic Books, 1998), The 




identify and analyze the “signs” in an ad to interpret the deeper meaning.  The classic 
work of this school is Judith Williamson’s Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and 
Meaning in Advertising (1994).13 
The informational/historicity school looks at the advertising industry without 
taking a strong stance, and instead wants to present the information without pressing into 
one of the larger worldviews.  These works serve the crucial function of showing the 
development of the consumer culture and marketing.  Some of the influential works of 
this line of thought are Susan Strasser’s Satisfaction Guaranteed: The Making of the 
American Mass Market (1995), Gary S. Cross’ An All-Consuming Century: Why 
Commercialism Won in Modern America (2000), Daniel Pop’s The Marking of Modern 
Advertising (1983) and Craig H. Roell’s The Piano in America, 1890-1940 (1989).  This 
thesis falls into this category. 
There are a number of different strategies to analyze advertisements, campaigns 
and slogans.  An effective test for slogans is known as the reverse strategy.  In this 
method, you simply “reverse the strategy and ask if the reversed strategy applies to the 
competition.”14  So, for example, Coca-Cola’s famous “The Real Thing” would fit this 
method.  Reversed and applied to Pepsi, this method would suggest that Pepsi is the 
“fake” thing. 
There are six main techniques that advertisers will use to attempt to push the 
product.  The first way is through involvement, which is an important technique in 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Jean Kilbourne, Deadly Persuasion: The Addictive Power of Advertising (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1999) and Naomi Wolf, The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty Are Used Against Women (New York: 
Morrow, 1991). 
13 Judith Williamson, Decoding Advertisements: Ideology and Meaning in Advertising (London and 
Boston: Marion Boyars, 1978; re-issued 1994). 




telemarketing and mass mailings.  One way to involve the consumer is to have them 
complete a task, such as peeling off a sticker and placing it on an envelope, or by getting 
them to answer questions before launching into the spiel.  Other ads will appeal to the 
emotions, especially acceptance and the creation of a sense of community and belonging 
to a larger group.  Ads also may attempt to appeal to an association, to encourage 
consumers to associate that product with an idea of wealth, fame, or happiness, and 
occasionally use contests to allow people to enter into these fantasies.  General Motors is 
one of the best examples of market segment or positioning.  The company will position 
their brands as just for you, the consumer.  So, for example, if you cannot afford a 
Cadillac, GM has other cars available that might fit in your price range.  Fear is another 
method, but because it can backfire and force the consumer to associate fear with that 
product many companies do not use this technique.  But fear can be more than just a 
public service announcement to scare people away from drinking and driving, and some 
can use phrases that are similar to what a mother might say to her child (“sit up straight, 
eat your peas, don’t make faces like that”). 
Finally, some ads will use buzz words, like “free,” “save,” “new and improved,” 
all of which are sometimes used in conjunction with other subjective words. Advertisers 
will frequently use these subjective words to puff out their advertisements without 
making them false.  The Federal Trade Commission’s stance on the matter is that “[a]n 
advertiser cannot be charged with liability with respect to every conceivable 
misconception, however outlandish, to which his representation might be subject among 
the foolish or feeble-minded.”15  There are numerous types of puffery.  The most basic 




type is not limited to just words, and can apply to images or scenes, such as the Marlboro 
Man implying independence and ruggedness.  Advertisements may also use meaningless 
comparisons where they do not state what the product is more or better than, for example 
“Magnavox gives you more.”16   
This work, in short, will examine the various advertising strategies and 
advertisements of the Toyota Motor Corporation in an attempt to decipher the levels of 
meaning in the ads themselves, as well as possible interpretations of the target audience.  
Thus, it is important to place them in their larger historical picture, as well as examine a 
few contemporary advertisements from competitors.  The competitor ads can help to 
show what Toyota did differently, or how Toyota worked to fit into the mold provided by 
other companies. 
Covering all of the ads in the history of Toyota is impossible.  Therefore, I limited 
my focus to the early years of Toyota, covering their meager beginnings and eventual rise 
to surpass the first of the Big Three.  Looking at the big picture, it would seem that going 
through the end of the second oil crisis, which started in 1979, would help to explain 
Toyota’s rise.  However, before the crisis even began, Toyota was the third largest 
automobile manufacturer in the world.  Also, in 1980, Toyota launched a new advertising 
campaign that would carry them through the early 1980s.  Stopping with the end of an 
advertising campaign fits with the overall focus of the thesis, which is about the specific 
advertisements and campaigns of the company.  The oil crisis that started in 1979 merely 
allowed Toyota to make further inroads into the American market, but also helped to 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 http://www.lawpublish.com/ftc-decept.html 
16 For more on puffery see Ivan L. Preston, The Tangled Web They Weave: Truth, Falsity and Advertisers 
(University of Wisconsin Press, 1996) and The Great American Blow-Up: Puffery in Advertising and 




establish clashes between the American and Japanese governments about the automobile 
industry.  However, it would take time before these problems could begin, as the U.S. 
government had more pressing events, such as the oil shortage and hostage crisis, on the 
table. 
In a time when news of rising gas prices and the problems of continued 
dependency on foreign oil often dominate the headlines, examining a company that often 
positions itself as an alternative to the gas guzzlers gives unique insight into the realm of 
the automobile industry.  With the continued decrease in prestige and power of the 
American automobile industry, and the steady interest in Japanese vehicles, Toyota 
seems an obvious choice.  But even without these problems, studying Toyota specifically 
provides a glance at just how much the United States, and the world in general, has 





A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TOYOTA MOTOR COMPANY 
Before one can begin to understand Toyota advertising, it is important to know 
the background of the company.  Events that took place early in Toyota’s history 
influenced their progression, and their advertising.  The early beginnings of the company 
also played a large role in the way that the leaders responded to various attacks and 
challenges, such as pollution legislation or rising gas prices.  The goals and outlook of the 
company come from the ideas established at its founding.  Knowing the history of the 
company can also explain why they established a branch in the United States when they 
did, and why they would advertise certain ways during particular periods.  The history of 
the company displays the struggle to survive under outside pressures, as well as the 
adaptation to their surroundings.  All of these factors help explain why Toyota is the 
company that it is today. 
The history of Toyota Motor Company actually begins farther back than the 
establishment of the company itself.  For roughly two hundred and fifty years, from the 
early 1600s until 1868, the Japanese lived in relative peace, stability and isolation from 
the outside world.  Under the Tokugawa Shoguns, Japan restricted interaction with 
foreigners, both Western and Chinese, to the port city of Nagasaki.  The shoguns ended 
the long period of civil war and unrest during the warring states period and provided the 
Japanese with the calm they needed to develop the merchant class.  This isolation 
changed in 1853, when Commodore Matthew Perry arrived in Edo (now Tokyo) Bay, 




rebels succeeded in removing the shogun from power and restoring the emperor.  This 
instance, the Meiji Restoration, pushed Japan along the path to industrialization. 
The new government sought to promote industrialization and Westernization.  
Japan realized that it needed to catch up with the advanced Western world or else face the 
fate of nations such as China and India.  After creating a new constitution and a new 
army, the government also promoted education.  The Japanese imported Western 
technology and worked to promote a “rich country, strong army,” as one popular slogan 
stated.  Under this period of rapid change, the Japanese economy grew and new business 
started to compete with the West. 
Toyota’s Founder, Sakichi Toyoda 
Born in February of 1867 in a small town in Shizuoka Prefecture, Sakichi 
Toyoda17 first trained as a carpenter under his father.  He quickly grew bored with that 
life, and so turned his energies to inventing.  He started by examining the looms local 
women employed to make cloth.  He wanted to improve the standard of living for the 
Japanese.  Sakichi wrote that “[a]lthough everybody in my village was a farmer, every 
house also had its own handloom. I began thinking about ways to power the looms so that 
weaving could be done faster, and more cloth could be made more cheaply. People could 
then buy cotton goods for less, and that would benefit society substantially.”18 
He began to build working wooden models using trial and error methods until he 
could improve on these designs.  By 1890, he had a wooden manual loom that 
dramatically increased output by 50 percent and even increased the quality of the fabric.  
                                                 
17 All names will be presented in the Western form of first name then last name.  Members of the Toyoda 
family will be listed by their first names during the paper, while others will be listed by their last name. 
18 Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota: A History of the First 50 Years (Toyota City: Dai Nippon Printing 




He received a patent from the government for this design.  Moreover, by 1897, he 
designed and implemented his first power loom.  It was still a wooden frame, and the 
cloth produced was at a Japanese, not Western, standard.19 
That year, the Mitsui Corporation stepped in to make a deal with Sakichi.  They 
would sell the looms, finance a plant and provide a business manager so that Sakichi 
would do research.  It is during this time that he developed the concept of kaizen or 
continuous improvement.  By 1902, Sakichi resigned from the company.  In 1905, he lent 
the patent rights to the Kanebo Company, who built a loom in Osaka.  The company did a 
comparative test and found that the British Platt Brothers loom was more efficient. 
Sakichi took a trip to the United States and saw first hand the automobile industry 
at work.  He realized that there was a market for cars and that it would be a good idea to 
try to start his own automobile company in the future.  In 1918, he established Toyoda 
Spinning and Weaving Co., Ltd., with Risaburo Toyoda as the director.  Risaburo was 
Sakichi’s adopted son and replaced Kiichiro as the oldest.  A Shanghai branch of the 
company was set up in 1920.  The 1920s were also important for the automobile industry 
as both Ford and General Motors established offices in Japan in the middle of the decade.  
At the time, however, Toyoda was not producing automobiles, so the American intrusion 
did not mean anything for the company.  However, once Toyoda entered this field, they 
had to fight the stronger American companies for a share of the market. 
Sakichi continued to work on loom and loom production rather than turning his 
energies to automobiles.  He established Toyoda Automatic Loom Works Ltd., a 
company that would produce the looms in 1927.  By 1929, Toyoda looms could 
                                                 
19 Yukiyasu Togo, Against All Odds (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), 15-20.  Japanese cloth was 




outperform the British Platt Brothers models.  Sakichi sold them the patent rights and 
then directed that the money should be used for the development of cars.  Before he died 
in October 1930, Sakichi directed that Kiichiro should be in charge of the development of 
the automobiles.  Therefore, Risaburo and the board of directors provided money for 
Kiichiro to begin his research. 
First automobiles 
It was not until December 1933 that the company had an automobile department, 
still under the “Toyoda” name.  The following year, the company completed its first Type 
A prototype engine, to be followed by the First Model A1 passenger car prototype some 
eight months later and the Model G1 truck after that.  Production of Model AA passenger 
cars began in April 1936, almost a year after the introduction of the prototype.  The next 
month, the company opened an assembly plant, and the following month they established 
a laboratory.  In July, they exported four G1 trucks to Northeast China, the first export 
shipment of the company.20 
During this period, the automobile section operated under Toyoda Spinning and 
Weaving.  Kiichiro was in charge of that section, but his adopted brother, Risaburo, was 
in charge of the company.  The two clashed on numerous occasions, especially when 
Kiichiro requested more money in order to continue working on automobile designs and 
production.  However, Kiichiro did have some power, as he was the true son of Sakichi.  
In fact, he made an agreement with of the head of the Toyoda branch in Shanghai, to send 
money from a profitable area to fund the production of trucks. 
                                                 





The company developed principles based on Sakichi’s ideas.  On October 30, 
1935, the company codified them into the Toyoda Precepts, which stated: 
Be contributive to the development and welfare of the country by working 
together, regardless of position, in faithfully fulfilling your duties.  Be at the 
vanguard of the times through endless creativity, inquisitiveness and pursuit of 
improvement.  Be practical and avoid frivolity. Be kind and generous; strive to 
create a warm, homelike atmosphere. Be reverent, and show gratitude for things 
great and small in thought and deed. 
 
These are the basic tenets of the organization even today, and have greatly influenced the 
direction and growth of the company.21 
Shotaro Kamiya joined the company in October 1935, leaving his position in 
General Motors (GM) to work for a company that would build Japanese cars.  Kamiya’s 
experience at GM would prove to be highly beneficial, as he could provide some insight 
that Kiichiro and others needed.  Kamiya was also on good terms with dealers and used 
nationalistic ideas to convince them to sell these new vehicles.  Shortly after his arrival, 
he worked with the staff to complete preparations for a small exhibition in Tokyo on 
November 21.  The company sent five model G1 trucks, and although they had many 
problems on the way, the show was a huge success.   
December 8, 1935, marked the first showing of the vehicles to the local market, 
with an exhibition at Hinode Motors in Nagoya.  Kamiya started working on a sales 
network and wanted, as he put it, to establish “dealer outlets using local capital and local 
managers….  [He] thought that the most effective way to establish a network quickly was 
to convince dealers of imported cars to join Toyoda and sell domestic cars.”22  The 
company now produced buses and the AB Phaeton, as well as other vehicles, and 
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Kiichiro established a Tokyo office for research.  Eiji Toyoda, Kiichiro’s cousin, worked 
at this office. 
However, sales of the automobiles were low for the entire industry, as the 
American made cars were not only better built but had a better reputation.  May 1936 was 
an important turning point for the company.  The Japanese government passed the Law 
Concerning the Manufacture of Motor Vehicles.23   It “provided in part that automakers 
would be exempt from income and business taxes for five years, and exempt from duties 
on materials, tools, machinery and other imported items needed for conducting their 
manufacturing operations.”24  The government required all companies to obtain a license; 
only Toyoda and Nissan applied for one.  With government relief as well as protection 
from imports, Kiichiro and his staff could focus on production.   
Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. 
In August 1937, Kiichiro established the Toyota Motor Co., Ltd. (TMC), with 
Risaburo as president and Kiichiro as vice-president.  The company made the name 
change to “Toyota” for several reasons.  They held a contest for a new logo design, which 
had to include the characters for Toyoda.  After examining the entries, the company 
changed names to Toyota for clarity in pronunciation.  In addition, for the Japanese, eight 
is considered an especially lucky number.  The characters for Toyoda require ten strokes, 
while Toyota only takes eight.  Therefore, the company changed their name and began 
using the new logo.  Additionally, by November 1938, the new plant at Koromo was in 
operation.   
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During these early years, Toyota focused its energies on the production of trucks.   
The government continually pushed Toyota to produce trucks for the military, especially 
as the conflict in China became more heated, erupting soon into a world war.  From 1936 
until 1941, the company produced a limited number of buses, but due to supply and 
pressure from the military, they stopped production on those vehicles.25  For example, in 
1940, almost 92 percent of the vehicles were trucks, and by 1945 it was 100 percent of 
the total production.   
The same was also true for Nissan, Toyota’s main domestic competitor.  In 1941, 
Nissan produced mostly standard sized trucks (86.6 percent), and only 8.1 percent of their 
total production went to small cars.  In that year, they did not make any standard size 
cars.26  In comparison with Toyota, in 1940, 92.7 percent of the vehicles were trucks.  By 
1945, Nissan, like Toyota, was at 100 percent truck production as well.  From 1934 until 
1945, Nissan only produced 19,627 cars, and their total production of trucks during that 
period was 84.7 percent.27 
Kiichiro became president of Toyota Motor Company in January 1941.  In a far-
reaching strategic move, he immediately decided that the company should make 45 
percent of its own components.  Therefore he introduced the now famous and much 
copied just-in-time28 system of production.  This system basically follows the principle 
that you create the products you need just-in-time.  It follows the same logic as stocking 
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items at a grocery store; you replenish the stock as you go, giving the customers their 
items just-in-time.  The company would therefore develop expertise in its product, as 
well as reduce the need for large stocks.  This decision forced the company to establish a 
section that would later become Nippondenso, one of the largest producers of electronic 
equipment for automobiles. 
The conflict with China helped save Toyota.  With only two companies able to 
produce the trucks ordered by the Japanese military, Toyota was able to sell old 
inventory.  The government’s ban on the production of automobiles forced Toyota to 
focus solely on trucks.  Toyota made different models and worked to create trucks that 
could operate on a variety of terrains as needed in the different islands and fronts.  For 
tactical purposes, one truck could be taken apart and put back together when needed, as 
the company developed a frame with multiple sections.  Another vehicle was amphibious 
and could run on the water and on sand. 
Nonetheless, Toyota faced several problems with material supplies as the war 
progressed.  With a shortage of metals needed to produce the trucks, Toyota had to 
stockpile existing materials.  This surplus of materials, however, went directly against the 
just-in-time system laid out by Kiichiro.  The stockpiling strategy not withstanding, it 
became harder and harder for Toyota to produce the required amount of trucks due to the 
continued supply shortages.  Their total production declined over the war years, and the 
make-up of employees changed to include virtually all levels of society.  Eiji remembered 




working for us, as well as schoolchildren and townspeople – both men and women.  
There were nuns and geishas, and even convicted criminals.”29 
Post-War Reconstruction 
Close to the end of the war, on August 14, 1945, the United States bombed the 
area surrounding the Toyota plant.  One bomb leveled a portion of the plant, but an 
advanced warning assured that no one died in the attack.  Once Japan surrendered, 
Kiichiro started to look for ways to provide the basics to his employees.  He recognized 
that there would be no market for automobiles for some time as Japan rebuilt itself from 
the destruction of the conflict.  He looked into producing food, including raising loaches 
(fresh water fish that resemble eels) and making fish paste.  He set up a chinaware 
franchise and worked to produce concrete for housing.  Much needed clothing was 
already being produced, as the spinning plants were still in operation.  As part of the 
Toyoda zaibatsu, the spinning plants enabled the automobile company to survive even 
when the Japanese economy could not support automobile consumption. 
Nevertheless, Toyota received orders from the occupation government that 
allowed them to build trucks and buses in 1946.  The only project Kiichiro started in the 
immediate post-war era that continued was the concrete production, which became 
Toyoda Soken.  Later, to support the company, Toyota opened some dry-cleaning 
businesses.  Also, in 1946, the government passed the Labor Union Law, creating unions 
in all businesses in Japan.  Toyota was no exception, thus forming the Toyota Motor 
Koromo Labor Union in January 1946.30  The labor unions were a huge obstacle to the 
Japanese, as to this day, unions in Japan have little power over the company.  
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Management did and does not view unions in a positive light, as they feel that the 
company should do what is best for the employees, and that a union will only hinder the 
day-to-day business.  However, since the order came from the occupational forces, the 
Japanese had to comply. 
Toyota worked closely with the Allied Headquarters (GHQ).  In 1946, Kiichiro 
found that the company could produce a limited number of trucks to use for 
reconstruction efforts.  Moreover, he began working on plans for a new car, so that when 
GHQ eased restrictions on cars the company would be ready.  Kamiya was also selected 
as an advisor to the GHQ for the automobile industry.  He often used his knowledge and 
influence to make gains for the company and the industry as a whole.  Kiichiro’s work 
paid off.  In June 1947 GHQ asked Toyota for 50 cars to use for their office.  The 
company also held a contest to find a nickname for the new car. The company selected 
Toyopet. 
The United States worked to restrict the rising inflation in the Japanese economy.  
One measure was the “Dodge Line” instituted in 1949.  Highly controversial, it insisted 
that the Japanese would need to balance the budget while decreasing the money supply.  
The government would also need to reduce intervention in the economy through a 
gradual phase out of price controls.  Finally, the government would eliminate support and 
funds given to private companies.31  Eiji noted that while the policy “was successful in 
curbing inflation, it threw the country into a deep recession.”32 
As part of the strategy of occupation, the Supreme Command for the Allied 
Powers (SCAP) also wanted to remove concentrations of power, like those found in the 
                                                 
31 James L. McClain, Japan: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 573. 




zaibatsu, which propelled the Japanese economy to its pre-war power.  Zaibatsu were 
large and diverse operations, essentially a form of big business.  Unlike the American 
model, the Japanese zaibatsu frequently contained manufacturing and mining ventures, as 
well as banks, shipping, and trading companies.33  While Toyota was not as large a 
zaibatsu as Mitsui or Mitsubishi, its diversification was still troubling for the Allied 
commanders.  The commanders were nervous because, during its early years, Toyota was 
part of the “new” zaibatsu, “business complexes firmly based upon heavy industries – 
steel, chemicals, engineering, electrical machinery and automobiles.”34  Therefore, by 
order of SCAP’s Enterprise Reconstruction and Reorganization Plan, Toyota detached 
some of their companies, such as Nippondenso and Toyoda Spinning and Weaving.35  
Moreover, Toyota, as a restricted concern, could also not “own stock in another 
company” nor “have their personnel serve as staff members or employees of another 
company.  Furthermore, staff personnel or employees of a restricted concern were either 
forbidden to own any stock in another company or the number they could own was 
limited.”36 
Fortuitously, in 1947, Taiichi Ohno came to the Toyota Motor Company from 
Toyoda Spinning and Weaving.  He was put in charge of the second machine shop and 
immediately saw a great deal of waste in the manufacturing process.  The just-in-time 
system started by Kiichiro declined during the war, but he saw that now with recovery the 
system could once again aid the company.  Ohno worked to refine this system, and first 
started this process in the machine shop he managed.  His first suggestion was to arrange 
                                                 
33 Mansel G. Blackford, The Rise of Modern Business in Great Britain, The United States, and Japan 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 106. 
34 Ibid., 159.  




the machines in the shape of an L to have workers operate more than one machine.  
Employees at first resisted the implementation of this process, but Ohno’s system 
eventually triumphed with the backing of management. 
Additionally, Ohno initiated another system that of the kanban, or signboards, that 
would convey “information in and between processes on instruction cards.”37  Along with 
the signboards and cards, Ohno encouraged workers to question the processes, asking 
“why” five times to find the solution.  The company limited wasted movements as well, 
and would arrange machines and tools in such a manner that would support the flow of 
work.  Some of these techniques were supposed to help morale and worker pride, but 
more often than not, forced the workers into a confined area for the entire day.  While 
production increased, the workers frequently felt more like robots than humans. 
One reason for the implementation of these new arrangements, as well as with the 
kanban system in general, is the way that the Japanese unions operated, and continue to 
operate today.  Quite different than in the U.S., most unions in Japan are company, not 
occupation, based.  At Toyota, like many Japanese companies, employees learn a number 
of skills and jobs rather than focusing on one specific area.  This allows for the company 
to make changes to operations that unions in America would never allow.  The workers 
often focus more on what is good for the company than what is good for themselves.  
This practice tends to create company loyalty and unity between the employees.  
Employees feel ties to the company, and would rather work with management than fight 
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them at every step.  Also, the Japanese system tends to create bonds of trust and 
assurance between employees and management.38 
Rebuilding and Recovery 
The year 1950 was a tough and busy one for the company.  The union went on its 
first, and only strike, when Kiichiro found himself forced to go against his words.  In 
order to raise money to continue production, Kiichiro had to turn to the banks.  The bank 
managers decided that to save money, the company needed to cut back on employment.  
When Kiichiro announced this decision to the workers, they went on strike.  Negotiations 
dragged on for some time.  Following traditional Japanese bushido beliefs, Kiichiro took 
the blame for the problems and sought to restore the honor of the company by resigning 
thereby ending the conflict.39  Taizo Ishida, then president of Toyoda Automatic Loom 
Works, came to take his place.  Eiji believes that Kiichiro selected Ishida in order to “win 
back confidence in the company” from the banks and employees as the Loom Works 
consistently made high profits.40   
Also in April 1950, the company opened Toyota Motor Sales Company (TMS) 
with Kamiya as the head.  As with other branches, the anti-zaibatsu laws would not allow 
the sales department to function within the same company.  The three main business 
objectives for the new company were “marketing automobiles and automobile 
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components; acting as an accident insurance agent; and performing all business related to 
the foregoing two items.”  The company decided to act autonomously and not favor the 
Toyota dealers or the company.  Another goal was to “keep its profit margin at the 
approximate level as Toyota’s former Sales Department, and therefore not cause an 
increase in production costs.”  Kamiya also stated that they would study the market to 
promote sales of vehicles to all people, as well as maintain close relations with other 
dealers.41 
The year 1950 brought other changes as well, when Toyota started to draw up 
cooperation plans with Ford.  Unfortunately, or possibly fortunately for Toyota, no 
sooner had the two companies finalized the deals, when North Korea invaded South 
Korea, launching the Korean War.  Part of the deal stated that Ford would send 
technicians to Japan to help Toyota, but the U.S. government would not allow these 
people to leave the country and the deal had to be cancelled.  Nevertheless, Eiji and 
others were allowed to view the Ford plants and took this opportunity to travel to the 
United States.  Eiji was startled to find that Toyota was not all that far behind Ford and 
other companies in terms of capabilities.  Indeed, if Toyota would increase the output, 
they could easily reach the same numbers as Ford and GM produced. 
Eiji instituted the suggestion system in 1951 after his trip to the United States.  
Under this system, the company encouraged employees to make suggestions to improve 
the products, working conditions, and other aspects of the company.  The company set up 
a new board, the Creative Idea Committee, to review these suggestions.  Top managers 
often held positions on the board, supporting the involvement of employees from all 
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levels of the company.42  Until 1965, however, the number of suggestions remained 
small.  The company sought to encourage employees to make suggestions, and promoted 
a system that felt less formal.  For example, the company replaced some kanji (formal, 
ideographic) characters with the phonetic ones.  As a result, the amount of suggestions 
exploded after 1965, surpassing the three million mark by 1979.  By 1979, over 90 
percent of these suggestions were put to use, emphasizing the relationship between 
managers and employees.43 
MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, granted financial 
assistance to Toyota, Nissan and Isuzu in 1951.  Originally named the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Commerce, and going through other name changes as the country 
propelled itself to industrialization and world war, MITI as it came to be known was first 
established in 1949.  MITI was the most important agency in industrializing and 
propelling Japanese business in the post-World War II era.  The ministry could interfere 
in business, and would often focus the economy on one industry to push Japan forward. 
By the time MITI granted assistance to the three main automobile companies, 
American occupation forces were starting their withdrawal from Japan, leaving the 
Japanese to work out their own policies.  Toyota, Nissan and Isuzu received tax 
exemptions on imported production machinery, as well as other assistance in order to 
rebuild the industry.  While other companies developed ties with foreign automakers, 
Toyota focused its energies on in-house production.  Eiji hired Kenya Nakamura to 
develop a new passenger car that would be good for the taxi industry.  The company 
asked representatives to send feedback on what they wanted, so that Toyota could 
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produce a car that would sell.  In March 1952, Kiichiro died, and Risaburo died two 
months later.  These two men, so important for the early developments at Toyota, left 
behind a legacy that the new leaders felt had to succeed.  But to do so, the company 
needed to sell the cars that Kiichiro so struggled to produce. 
That summer, Kamiya pressured Ishida to reduce the cost of the cars.  In order to 
continue to sell cars, the company had to produce vehicles that could compete with 
imports.  In order to do so, the price had to go down.  The company cut prices twice, and 
in December 1952, the company saw a rise in sales.  Kamiya believed that lowering the 
price on the vehicles would increase demand, which would in turn raise production and 
lower the costs.  Moreover, as a tandem strategy, Kamiya noted that they starting in 1952, 
the company moved to a fixed-price system.  In 1953, Toyota decided to promote a new 
automobile marketing system, partially by employing college graduates as salesmen.44 
Taiichi Ohno, the father of the kanban system, used technology from Ford to once 
again increase production.  He implemented the use of a monitoring switch, along with 
lights, to allow workers to watch more than one machine.  The switches would shut down 
any malfunctioning machine, and a light would notify the workers of the problem.  As a 
result, he saw a rapid increase in production in his machine shop.  The new system was 
put into place in other areas, as well, but there was some resistance to the increased 
responsibility.  Nevertheless, upper management supported Ohno, so the company 
implemented the new measures. 
To promote sales and prepare for a new car design, Kamiya set up Tokyo Toyopet 
Company in March 1953.  Essentially, this company, located in Tokyo, was a dealership 
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under the management of Toyota Motor Sales Company.  He wanted to increase sales in 
Tokyo to influence the market in the rest of Japan, and establish Toyota as a successful 
company.45  Moreover, this office could act as a testing ground for new sales techniques, 
which other dealers could later implement.  It would also act as a barrier in case of 
decreased demand, as the new dealership could strategically hold some of the unsold 
cars.   
The two big sellers for Toyota at this time were the Toyopet Super and the 
Crown.  The Super sold well in the taxi market.  The first Crown model came off the 
assembly line on New Year’s Day, January 1, 1955, driven by Eiji himself.  The car sold 
well to private individuals, and later to taxi companies.  Toyota released a new model of 
the Crown, the Deluxe, to draw in new consumers.  One of the most interesting features 
of the Crown model is that the rear doors opened from the center to the back, and that 
most of the components for the vehicle came from in-house production.  With these two 
successful models, Toyota was now well on its way to establishing itself in the Japanese 
automobile market.   
Despite these few successes, trucks still constituted the majority of the vehicles 
that Toyota sold.  Rival Nissan dominated the domestic car market, and Toyota struggled 
to surpass them.  In 1950, Nissan produced 54.3 percent of the total number of cars in 
Japan, while Toyota only made 29 percent.  Within a year, Toyota had significantly 
evened the odds with Nissan at 47.2 percent and Toyota at 40.7 percent.  Over the next 
few years, the two companies competed for dominance, even as other companies began 
to emerge as competitors as well.46 
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Specifically to battle Nissan, Toyota created a new model, the Corona.  The first 
Corona models were available by the late 1950s.  Unfortunately, the car did not perform 
well.  The company received reports that it was not sturdy enough for the Japanese roads, 
which at the time were incredibly bumpy and uneven.  Regrouping, they labored to fix 
the errors and make the Corona another quality car.  Once these updates were complete, 
the company deliberately decided to advertise the improvements.  The advertising 
campaigns focused on the cars going through torture and still running.  One commercial 
even showed the car pushed over a cliff, and once it landed, a driver managed to drive it 
away.  These ads led to increased sales, but Nissan continued to outsell Toyota. 
Push to the United States 
Ever resourceful and far thinking, Shotaro Kamiya pushed the company to open 
an office in the United States.  He realized that the company needed to gain a footing 
before the American government began to restrict imports in response to the rise of 
European vehicle sales.  In October 1957, Kamiya set up Toyota Motor Sales, USA in 
Los Angeles.  Shortly afterward, two Toyopet Crown models sent to the United States 
received a warm welcome.  Ironically, road tests showed that the car could not perform 
on the smoother American roads.  The engines could not handle the higher speeds 
common on American highways either, leading to breakdowns.  The name of the cars 
was problematic as well, going by the nickname Toyopet.47 
Eiji recognized the need for a new plant in Japan to keep up with the possibility of 
increased demand.  At first, he wanted the plant to accommodate 10,000 vehicles a 




month.  Soichiro Toyoda was put in change of the production committee, and worked 
much like his father, Kiichiro Toyoda, did in watching the construction.  He often went to 
the site to ensure the building went smoothly.  The company named this new facility the 
Motomachi Plant, which was really three smaller plants, a body shop, a painting shop, 
and an assembly line, combined in one location.48  By August 1959, after eleven months, 
the plant was ready for operation.   
Meanwhile, in the American branch, the company decided to postpone selling 
passenger cars in the United States.  Instead, they would sell only the Land Cruiser 
model, until the engineers in Japan designed a vehicle that would be a viable product in 
the American market.49  The Land Cruisers sold relatively well and managed to keep the 
fledgling branch open.  In 1963, Toyota sold 1,096 Land Cruisers.  The next year, they 
offered limited numbers of the Tiara car models, which were only a slight improvement 
over the Toyopet.  Significantly, in designing their next car, the company researched the 
desires of Americans and found motorists wanted some luxury in an affordable car.  In 
the summer of 1964, engineers had a prototype of the Toyota Corona ready.  By May 
1965, the American staff had their new cars to sell, including adjustments made to fit the 
American standards. 
Part of the reason for the import market’s decline and then rapid rise was due to 
the actions of the Big Three - Ford, GM and Chrysler - in America.  In response to the 
rise of imported vehicles, in the late 1950s and early 1960s the American companies cut 
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“size, weight, and price” for their own cars, causing a sharp decline in the percentage of 
imports sold.  By 1963, these American companies reverted to their old standards, as the 
import market was now only a small percentage.  The majority of these American 
vehicles increased in both size and weight.  The length increases were only a few inches, 
but the weights increased often by 300 pounds or more over the decade.  As a result of 
the changes in the American vehicles, as well as an increase in the status of owning an 
import, the sale of imports began to rise, reaching 15.1 percent of the U.S. market by 
1971.50 
The new Corona model, called the Tiara in the United States, “was the first 
imported car tailored exclusively to the needs of the American motorist.”51  It was set at 
an affordable price and offered some of the comforts of larger vehicles.  As part of a 
strategic marketing campaign, Toyota waited for dealers to have enough vehicles on hand 
to sell before they launched the advertisements.  When they did advertise, the company 
used the local version of national magazines, like Life and Time.  They also worked with 
the dealers to make a television commercial, which ran for eight months.52  In 1967, the 
company developed a new slogan, based on a customer testimonial.  This slogan, “Get 
your hands on a Toyota and you’ll never let go,” reflected the growth and respectability 
of the company in the United States. 
In the late 1960s, Toyota Motor Sales, USA sought to expand their network to 
handle the new models.  One man they recruited was James Moran, one of the largest 
Ford dealers in the United States.  His story is typical of many Americans.  At first, he 
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was reluctant to work with Toyota.  He decided to test-drive one of the vehicles before 
making any decision.  “Moran took the car out on the interstate, and he was amazed by its 
balance and tightness.  Durability, however was a different matter, so Moran decided to 
give the car the ultimate test.  While driving at fifty-five miles per hour, he threw the car 
into reverse.  To Moran’s amazement, nothing broke.”53  The more he learned about the 
company and their close relations with the dealers, the more that Moran realized he 
wanted to help the company and be part of it, and thereby also help the American 
consumers in the quest for an automobile that was of high quality yet also affordable. 
Toyota released the Corolla in October 1966, six months after Nissan launched 
the Sunny (Sentra).  To battle the competition, Toyota put a 1100cc engine in the Corolla, 
and then in their advertising, Toyota emphasized the extra 100ccs.54  The car received a 
warm reception, selling 12,000 in 1966 alone.  By 1976, the cumulative production of the 
Corolla was at five million cars!  The name Corolla means “crown of the flower” and 
follows in the general tradition of naming the early passenger cars at Toyota.  The 
company “gave all [their] early passenger cars names associated with ‘crown’ because 
[their] first passenger car, the Crown, had been something of a success and this was a 
good image [they] wanted to keep.”55 
Despite this success, shipping to the United States continued to be a problem for 
Toyota.  The first shipments often arrived with heavy damages, with the average costs at 
$18 a car, or in 2004 dollars, $101.92 after adjusting for inflation.56  After some talks 
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with the shipping company, damages decreased.  Nevertheless, Toyota knew that it 
needed to enter the shipping business for the best solution.57  During the summer of 1971, 
the International Longshoremen’s Warehouse Union went on strike, causing shipments of 
Toyota vehicles to divert to other ports.  The strike concluded in October, with help from 
a manager at Toyota.58   
The Tumultuous Seventies 
The 1970s were turbulent and trying years for the Toyota Motor Company, and 
automobile manufacturers in general.  In both Japan and the United States, the 
governments passed emissions restrictions requiring full cooperation for higher standards 
by the late-1970s.  In Japan, the government set up the Central Council for Control of 
Environmental Pollution.  The council set deadlines for 1975 and 1976, with the most 
stringent deadlines in 1978.  Larger companies in Japan, like Toyota, had a harder time 
meeting these deadlines, as they had to find different solutions for every car they 
produced.  The Japanese press therefore often made Toyota a villain, pointing to smaller 
manufacturers’ progress. 
Toyota “swallowed [its] pride and asked [Honda] for the technology,” of the 
CVCC (compound vortex-controlled combustion) engine, which enabled Toyota to get an 
extension on meeting the deadlines.  In order to meet the restrictions, Toyota had to go to 
a rival, as on its own they could not meet the first levels.59  The CVCC engine would not 
work for the later restrictions, so Toyota had to find other ways to reduce pollutants.  The 
main problem was finding a catalyst for the engines.  The company finally settled on 
using platinum and rhodium, for a short-term solution.  The methods of using noble 
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metals and a three-way catalyst were expensive, so Eiji had the team continue until they 
found a better way.60  By 1984 Toyota had a new engine design that used an “oxidation 
catalyst rather than a three-way catalyst to cut auto emissions.”61   
 Most of the industrialized world depended on imported sources of oil, especially 
Japan.  The major oil producing countries formed OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) in 1960 to protest demands placed on them by the major oil 
companies.  This organization did not show its true strength until the 1970s when it first 
threatened to, and then did, cut and limit exports.  OPEC holds nearly two-thirds of the 
world’s oil reserves, and its members include countries from the Middle East, Africa, and 
South America. 
The two oil crises, one in 1973 and the other in 1979, hit the automobile industry 
as hard as the environmental legislation.  In the midst of dealing with emissions 
standards, the companies now also had to deal with rising oil prices and a slumping 
consumer market.  With increasing tensions in the Middle East, which holds a majority of 
the oil, and is often seen as the core of OPEC, member nations tried to influence the West 
by threatening to cut off exports.  When they did cut their oil exports, oil shortages in 
many nations, including the United States and Japan, were the norm.  Toyota responded 
well to this problem, as their vehicles were smaller and more fuel-efficient than those of 
American companies.  Oil was necessary to fuel the vehicles, lubricate the engineers and 
run the factory machines. 
 Overall automotive production increased in Japan until 1973, and after a slight 
drop in 1974, the numbers started to climb again.  The only other dip in total production 
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came in 1981 and 1982.  Toyota was even out producing Nissan by this point, sometimes 
by more than 10 percent.62  Shotaro Kamiya’s long-term plan finally paid off for the 
company. 
 Corollas continued to sell well, and the Celica, released in the mid-1970s, was a 
huge success.  The Celica won Import Car of the Year Award in 1976, further raising 
Toyota sales.  As oil prices stabilized, however, Toyota cars did not sell as well.  Ever the 
entrepreneur, James Moran responded with “Toyotathons” to sell cars and people came 
around the clock.  These sales were such a huge success that other Toyota dealers copied 
the idea.  While sales did being to rebound, the second oil crisis proved a major sales ally 
in 1979.  Again, people turned to fuel-efficient and well-made vehicles.  By now, 
Japanese automobiles were so associated with these ideas that even American auto 
executives reluctantly recognized the quality.63 
 Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States government, under 
pressure from domestic automobile companies, started to push the Japanese government 
to restrict the number of imported cars.  As an alternative, some automobile companies in 
America suggested that the Japanese should build factories in the United States, an idea 
that six Japanese automobile companies, including Toyota, Honda and Nissan, later 
implemented.  They did not specify how to build these factories, and some went in them 
as sole ventures, and others, like Toyota, tested joint-ventures.  Toyota first decided to 
build a joint-operation plant to test the waters and develop strategies for further plants if 
needed.  After unsuccessful attempts with Ford, the company turned to General Motors 
and the two agreed on reopening a recently closed plant in California.  The new company 
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became New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc., (NUMMI).  After this test, the company 
decided to build its own venture in Kentucky.   The plant was in operation by 1987. 
Conclusions 
 What specifically attributed to Toyota’s success in both Japan and the rest of the 
world?  One of the most important features of Toyota, its emphasis on kaizen64 and lean 
production, has continually helped the company produce affordable cars.  These methods 
have also allowed for any problems with parts or cars to be solved before the company 
spends too much money on labor, back stock and production runs.  By implementing the 
just-in-time method, Toyota does not need to stockpile large amounts of parts, and 
eliminates the need for giant warehouses.  The suggestion system has helped improve 
company loyalty, as well as lead to improvements in the automobiles and work 
environment.  The decisions of Taiichi Ohno, Taizo Ishida, Eiji Toyoda and Shotaro 
Kamiya gave the company a head start in certain areas, notably in the U.S. market.  
Military conflicts and government intervention kept the company alive and invigorated 
during difficult times.  Still it was the two oil crises of the 1970s that gave the Japanese 
automobile industry as a whole the opportunity to fully break into the US market.  With 
the rise of gas prices, the public in the United States and across the world demanded fuel-
efficient cars.  The affordable prices of the Japanese automobiles also aided their appeal.  
Along with high quality and dependability, as seen by the number of awards and glowing 
reviews, Japanese automobiles attracted consumers who were searching for an alternative 
to the often crude, unsafe, and low quality American-made vehicles. 
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 Because of their quick and able responses to all of the challenges facing the 
company, Toyota was able to surpass most American and many Japanese manufacturers.  
The foundation of the company going back to Sakichi continue to keep the employees 
and managers striving for perfection in their product.  Moreover, good leaders enabled 
Toyota not only to adapt to new changes and overcome the challenges that often 
threatened to destroy the company, but the Japanese automobile industry as a whole often 
followed the example of Toyota.  Even the once proud and unassailable American 
automobile manufacturers, finally accepting the blame for their decline in the domestic 
and world market, sought to emulate the Japanese methods to improve their products.  
Eiji Toyoda’s educational tour of the United States to see what he could learn from the 
American system had finally come full circle. 
 American companies found themselves ill equipped to deal with imports.  At first, 
many dismissed them as a fad, or found that they held such a small percentage of the 
market that it did not directly harm their profits.  Even more serious than not responding 
to the threat effectively was that American manufacturers sent cars to their dealers 
expecting the dealers to fix any problems before and after selling the vehicle.  The 
disastrous results, frequently reported to consumers in magazines such as Consumer 
Reports and Time, as well as by consumer advocates such as Ralph Nader, increasingly 
persuaded consumers to look elsewhere, and especially to the Japanese alternatives.  
Toyota and other Japanese manufacturers instead focused on fixing problems on the line 
and sending quality cars to the dealers to sell.65    Japanese cars quickly gained a 
reputation of reliability and quality, even free of small defects, such as the trim falling off 
                                                 




the car.66  The companies often included small “gifts” with the cars that other companies 
did not include, such as extra fuses or a trunk release inside the glove box.67 
 Nevertheless, for all of their technological achievement, from the advanced 
factories, fast responses to the environmental challenges, and constant innovation, and 
their quality, vehicles do not always sell themselves.  It was the creative messages and 
the high quality of Toyota’s advertising that propelled this once modest company to be 
one of the top companies in the world. 
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READY: INTRODUCING TOYOTA TO AMERICA 
 In 1957 Toyota was unknown to the American market.  So, the first thing that the 
new branch had to do was to introduce itself to the American people.  That task was not 
as easy as it may sound.  In a world where the Big Three (Ford, GM and Chrysler), plus 
American Motors as a distant fourth, dominated the markets and convinced the typical 
consumer to look for bigger and bigger cars, Toyota seemed outclassed.  The post-World 
War II prosperity only furthered the desire for “bigger and better” as consumers could 
spend where they previously saved and hoarded.  European cars dominated the small 
vehicle market, making it even more difficult for Toyota to find a niche. 
 To make matters worse, the vehicles Toyota made did not handle well in 
America.  But Toyota, fearing that they would be locked out of America if they did not 
open a branch soon, plodded ahead and launched themselves into the market.  It took the 
new branch a number of years to find a small car to fit the needs and desires of the 
American consumer, but until then, they at least had a foothold in the country. 
 But the United States was not the first country to receive imports from Toyota.  In 
the early 1950s, the company sent vehicles to South and Central America, and entered 
into agreements with nations in Southeast Asia.  Although, Toyota found that many 
Australians harbored negative feelings towards the Japanese from World War II, they 
persevered there and even exported to the Middle East and Africa, with sales picking up 
in the late 1950s. 
 By the time Toyota was facing problems with its imports in America, the Big 




slump forced Toyota to close branches in America and focus its energies on one vehicle, 
the Land Cruiser, and plan for their comeback.  That comeback came in 1965 with the 
introduction of the Corona. 
Toyota Vehicles  
One the main problem facing Toyota, as well as Nissan, in these early years was 
the price of their vehicles.  For example, in 1957, European import cars sold for less in 
their home countries than Toyota and Nissan vehicles sold in Japan.  Their cars were 
simply not competitive.  Luckily for Toyota and Nissan, in Japan there was “a 40-percent 
value-added tax, in addition to shipping costs for importers,” which kept the European 
prices high.68  As a result, only 3.8 percent of vehicles sold in Japan in 1957 were 
imports.69  It wasn’t until the 1960s that these two companies began to improve the 
performance and output of their vehicles for the foreign markets. 
As previously mentioned, the first Toyota to be a big success in the United States was the 
Land Cruiser.  The vehicle itself was quite popular with American drivers, 
particularly rural ones.  Toyota noted that the vehicle sold well in more rural 
areas, and it held up better than its competitors.  After it debuted in the U.S. in 
1958, the Land Cruiser was the only vehicle that the company sold in America.  
The Land Cruiser also sold well in other nations, as it was rugged and tough 
enough to handle extreme conditions. 
Without the Land Cruiser, Toyota almost surely would have failed in its ventures 
in the United States.  Their other products did not handle well on American roads.  For 
example, the Toyota Crown was popular in Japan, but it tended to vibrate on American 
roads at speeds common to most Americans.  Furthermore, the Crown would often 
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overheat on long stretches of road or when driving over mountains.70  The name of the 
vehicles themselves, Toyopet, was unpopular with the public.   
By 1965, Toyota was ready to introduce a new vehicle to the United States, the 
Toyota Corona.  It was more powerful than the Volkswagen Beetle, and was similar in 
horsepower to the more popular American vehicles.  After careful research and surveys 
of the American public, the company introduced features the customers desired.  This 
was the first car the company was going to sell to American markets.  The 2000 GT was 
a sporty model, noted for its speed.  The company tested it in 1966, and set a number of 
speed records for automobiles.  However, it was only available in limited numbers and 
for a limited amount of time. 
Competitor Vehicles 
As early as 1958, domestic manufacturers noticed the boom in small-car sales.  
American Motors, Time noted, “made an even smaller, 100-in.-wheelbase 1958 Rambler 
American.”  The car was small and economical, coming with its own “do-it-yourself 
instruction book to cut repair costs.”  That same year, by contrast, Ford redesigned its 
popular Thunderbird, making it bigger and more powerful.  In fact, it grew in length by 
two feet, and had a V-8 engine.71 
 When the U.S. Senate voted to spend money to build a new parking deck for their 
cars, citing the growing size the vehicles, one Senator, Prescott Bush from Connecticut, 
stood up to deride the American automobile industry.  Time reported that he rose against  
these gargantuan monsters being forced down the throats of the buying public.  
They are too big, too fast, too powerful.  They are rapidly making obsolete our 
highways and endangering life and limb, and are enormously wasteful of raw 
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materials’ that should be saved for national security.  “Unless American 
manufacturers meet the public demand for smaller, cheaper cars, European 
imports will take over a steadily increasing share of the domestic market with 
serious effects upon employment in American automobile plants.”72 
 
Despite the now obvious foresight, however, other Senators stood up for the automobile 
industry, while some even failed to see the problem with bigger cars.   
 Even worse for the American automobile industry, the Senate Antitrust and 
Monopoly Subcommittee investigated the Big Four in 1958.  The president of American 
Motors, George Romney, complained that the problem was “too much concentration of 
power by Big Business and Big Labor, too little competition.”  He proposed that Ford 
and General Motors should be split into smaller companies, as should any company with 
at least 35 percent of its industry’s sales, and 25 percent if the company engaged in more 
than one industry.  And since these companies had large investments in the industry, they 
were unwilling to work on building smaller vehicles.  The president of Chrysler 
countered that the public wanted bigger cars and that the majority did not buy smaller 
models that Chrysler introduced in earlier years.73 
 A recession hit the country in 1958, spurring further problems for the automobile 
industry.  Sales were “down about 25 percent from last year” in March of that year.74  By 
the end of March, sales of even the middle-priced vehicles were down.  One possible 
explanation, at the time, was that “[t]he decline in popularity of the middle-priced car 
parallels the decline in prestige of buying.”  Another explanation is the rise of foreign 
cars, which were becoming dominat in the small-car market.  Some consumers enjoyed 
the prestige of owning a foreign car, but many in the market believed that foreign-car 
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sales would decline after some time.  One person, the president of Manhattan’s Hambro 
Automotive Corporation, believed that the import sales would never top 300,000.  And at 
the time, his estimate seemed appropriate as “the U.S. auto industry has narrowed from 
more than 2,000 different automobiles to 17 makes turned out by five major companies 
that produce 96 percent of all cars sold in the U.S.”75 
 Toyota’s main competitor, in terms of the size of vehicles and market Toyota 
wanted to break into, was Volkswagen.  Before 1965, Toyota was still a minor player in 
the American market.  Consumer Reports noted 
In the United States, all small cars live, in a sense, in the rotund shadow of the 
Volkswagen 1200.  VW’s sales figures are double all its rivals’ put together.  By 
comparison with monthly VW sales of around 30,000 cars, two of the three cars 
tested for this issue, the Datsun and Sinca, sell about 1000 per month, and Saab 
sells even less.76 
 
But by 1965, the Volkswagen was facing more serious competition. Besides the release 
of the Toyota Corolla, others, such as Datsun and Saab released their vehicles in the 
American market.  Consumer Reports obviously liked the Datsun.  In 1965 they reported 
that it was most like American cars “with its familiar arrangement of components, its 
comparatively quiet running, its relatively soft ride, full equipment and a level of quality 
in details of finish that would put many U.S. cars to shame.”77 
 Between 1959 and 1965, the American market, in general grew.  In 1959, the Big 
Three introduced their own small cars – the Chevrolet Corvair, the Ford Falcom and the 
Plymouth Valiant.  European imports continued to dominate the small car market 
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however, with Volkswagen accounting for the largest percentage of sales.78  Sales of 
American vehicles increased in 1959 and 1960, briefly dropped in 1961, and then 
climbed again through 1962 and 1963.  For example, in 1959, Ford sold over 1.3 million 
automobiles, but in 1961 sold just over 700,000.  By 1963, the company jumped back to 
over 900,000 vehicles.79 
The American market was booming, as evident in the rising sales of the period.  
GM’s earnings in 1964 were a remarkable $1.735 billion80 after taxes, or higher than 
those posted by any company in American history.81  In January 1965, U.S. automakers 
sold 693,323 passenger cars, an increase of 21 percent over sales of the previous year, 
and Chrysler and Ford increased their market shares to 14.4 percent and 27.4 percent 
respectively.  The car that sold the best was the Ford Mustang, carving out an incredible 
5.1 percent of the market in its first year.82  Throughout the year, automobile 
manufacturers continued to sell and produce at amazing speeds, and some factories 
worked three shifts, seven days a week and still could not meet demand.  More and more 
people were buying cars, and with an annual auto scrappage rate of 6,100,000 people 
needed to buy cars more frequently.  1966 models across the board grew longer, and 
compact cars were expected to fade out over the next few years.83 
 By 1965, more and more consumers desired luxury models, taking the sales of 
those vehicles to a record of 400,000 in a year.  Seeing the increase, other manufacturers 
released models to compete with the market that Cadillac once dominated, including the 
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Chrysler Imperial, the Buick Electra 225 and the Chrysler New Yorker.  Sales on sports 
cars rose as well, prompting new models in that field, from the Oldsmobile Starfire to the 
Chrysler 300-L.  The luxury cars included a number of features as standard equipment 
such as automatic transmission and power brakes.  More frequently these models had 
more comfortable seating, better suspension and larger engines.84 
Ralph Nader and Safety 
 Nevertheless domestic vehicles faced a number of potentially crippling 
challenges.  In their January 1965 issue, Consumer Reports noted that both Ford and 
Chrysler had problems with their early model 1965 vehicles.  The letter that Ford sent to 
consumers did not mention possible safety factors, and later statements from the 
company underplayed the dangers of the vehicles.  Consumer Reports believed that 
Ford is to be commended for extending this modification to cars already in the 
field.  But the letter fails to mention that, without the “improvement,” the rear 
suspension arm attachment may break loose from the chassis frame; this could 
result in the car’s veering completely out of control.85 
 
Even more disturbing developments came later in the year.  In a Senate subcommittee 
inquiry on auto safety, Arjay Miller, the president of Ford, 
devoted the bulk of his testimony to summarizing the contributions that Ford has 
made toward safety on the highway.  Among these contributions Mr. Miller 
included the “service campaign” that Ford “conducted to add reinforcement on 
the rear suspension on 1965-model Fords and Mercurys produced before 
September 24, 1964.”  The campaign was undertaken, Mr. Miller explained, 
because “severe tests at our proving grounds led us to believe that a failure could 
occur under extreme operating conditions after extended use.”86 
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Chrysler’s response to the problems in their vehicles seemed to be better, if for no other 
reason than Consumer Reports did not later comment on their defects.  Their problems 
were on a number of different models,  
all early Plymouth Furys, Chryslers, and full-sized Dodges are being called in 
from owners by their dealers for inspection to determine whether the steering-gear 
support needs re-welding.  Without this reinforcement, the steering gear could 
break loose from its mooring, possible to result in loss of steering control.87 
 
Chrysler, at least, seemed ready and willing to admit their defect, while Ford, it seems, 
was more concerned with profits than customer safety.  Neither company stressed the 
importance or dangers of not fixing the flaws, which is not only regrettable, but unethical, 
yet sadly characteristic of the dark side of the American industrial culture.  The emphasis 
on the “throw away culture” is clearly evident in this industry, as oftentimes the 
manufacturer made cars that would not last for more than a few years. 
Amid the problems of Ford and Chrysler, General Motors also faced several 
crises.  Despite lawsuits and claims that one of their vehicles was unsafe,  
GM’s response has consistently been an unembellished assertion that the Corvair 
is a safe car to drive.  It has said so to its critics, and it has said so to the plaintiffs 
in more than 160 lawsuits that have now been filed.  It even said so while settling 
one lawsuit out of court for a reported $70,000. 88 
To make matters worse, GM stalled on delivering documents to a judge in one case.  In 
continuing problems, the Federal Government and others began to draw up plans for a 
safety commission to set standards for vehicles. 
 While dealing these problems, the industry also had to face Ralph Nader’s Unsafe 
at Any Speed: The Designed-In Dangers of the American Automobile, first published in 
                                                 




1965.  This work, along with complaints and lawsuits against automobile companies, set 
in motion what would become important legislation to improve the safety of motor 
vehicles.  Nader felt the need to publish this book to display just how unsafe automobiles 
were, as most people did not realize the toll, both in human life and monetary, this new 
technology exacted.  “In accidents involving all modes of transportation - motor vehicles, 
trains, ships, and planes – the motor vehicle accounts for over ninety-two percent of the 
deaths, and ninety-eight percent of the injuries.”89 
 The major target for Nader’s attack was General Motors and its Corvair.  He tells 
the story of the woman who lost her left arm in an accident, and the cover-up by General 
Motors to settle out of court to avoid “expos[ing] on the public record one of the greatest 
acts of industrial irresponsibility in the present century.”90  As the trial revealed, General 
Motors knew about a defect in the vehicle, but did not instruct the public or the dealers in 
proper care or special products to fix the problem.91 
 Nader asserted that “the automobiles are produced with faulty features or 
components” and that it is “commonplace knowledge to those working in the industry.”  
These vehicles were not limited to the Corvair but other models from General Motors, 
Ford and Chrysler.  Nader reported on vehicles with brake problems, steering gears that 
broke loose, transmission problems, and many others.  He applauded the work of 
Consumer Union, but many times due to budget constraints, these people could not fully 
test every vehicle, and certainly could not test them for extended periods of time. 
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 One of the major problems of automobiles at the time, Nader contended, was that 
the steering columns were not collapsible and were responsible for harming drivers more 
often than the accident itself.  Despite numerous reports and studies about the dangers of 
the steering assemblies, automobile makers at the time had yet to make “effective energy-
absorbing steering wheels and non-penetrating steering columns either separately or, 
even better, in combination.”  In fact, the industry made excuses even with technological 
advances already available.92  The designs of the automobiles were the cause of a number 
of serious injuries, and the manufacturers seemed unwilling to change their vehicles. 
 Besides faults with the vehicles and their design, Nader also attacked air 
pollution.  He approvingly noted that already California began to issue new standards for 
vehicles to meet with their 1967 models.  The industry’s response was that the consumer 
would have to pay a higher price for these vehicles and the research to comply with the 
new standards.93  Nader did applaud the implementation of safety-belts, although no 
automobile company promoted them as a safety feature at the time. 
 So what did this book mean for the automobile industry?  Within a year of 
publication, Congress passed the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act and the 
Highway Safety Act.  The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act was 
responsible for setting minimum standards that all automobiles must meet.  The Act also 
created an advisory council that would collect data, inspect and sometimes test vehicles.  
Every vehicle, both imported and domestic, would have to meet the standards, as well as 
report defects, and turn over required information on vehicle testing.  Since its passing, 
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Congress amended this Act a number of times to include more strict timelines and 
broader goals for safety.94 
 Even before the book hit shelves, some American manufacturers made seat belts a 
staple for both the front and rear seats of their cars.  The added cost, around $22, would 
be passed on to the consumer.  In addition, Ford installed some 1965 models with a 
shatterproof windshield, and GM developed a device to limit the speed of a car should the 
consumer desire.95  During the Ninth Annual International Auto Show in April, some 
doctors protested against certain practices of the automobile industry.  Along with 
changes the U.S. government required for vehicles sold to the General Services 
Administration, including shock absorbing steering wheels and exhaust controls, these 
doctors pushed for similar changes on all models manufactured by the companies.96  For 
its 1966 models, GM made a number of safety features standard, including rear seat belts, 
padded dashboards, backup lights, electric windshield wipers and outside left-hand 
mirrors.97 
Toyota’s Specific Advertisement Strategies 
Amid these incurring challenges for the American automobile industry, Toyota 
made some major decisions about their advertising.  First, they concentrated on four 
cities Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle.  This move enabled them to 
“concentrate [their] forces” as well as “maintain control of the quality of the entire 
marketing and merchandising process.”98  The company also decided to focus on gaining 
a foothold in the import market first, comparing their progress only against non-
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American vehicles.  Another strategic decision was in the choice of dealers: the company 
selected only those of high quality to sell their vehicles.  To help implement their plan, 
the company also fostered relationships with financial institutions.  Finally, they built and 
stocked parts in America. 
By concentrating on a limited area, Toyota could focus their advertising budget 
on that area as well.  They ran print ads in some of the major magazines, but knew that 
they needed to advertise on television as well.  In order to find the funds to make the 
more expensive television commercials, the company “formed the first Toyota dealer 
advertising association.  The dealers pooled their resources with Toyota on a 50/50 basis 
with Toyota furnishing all of the advertising materials” for brochures and pamphlets.99  
The company produced its first television commercial in three versions and ran it for 
eight months.  This method allowed Toyota to set itself apart from the competition.  Only 
American companies were producing commercials, and Toyota was the first import to 
break into that market.  Toyota’s sales increased, allowing them to turn to other forms of 
advertising, including billboards, radio and newspapers.  They would no longer have to 
rely on the dealers to help subsidize their accounts, and could move into newer media. 
Another big help to the company was the 1967 James Bond film You Only Live 
Twice.  The sporty Toyota 2000GT brought the car and Toyota to the attention of more 
viewers than a single commercial or print ad.  In the movie, which is set almost entirely 
in Japan, a female Japanese spy named Aki drives the sporty Toyota.  Not only does the 
car handle well, it is also fast and looks good.  And like a good spy vehicle should be, this 
one is equipped with numerous toys, including a television monitor.  Bond’s character, 
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played by Sean Connery, seems impressed with the vehicle, especially when it out-
maneuvers the bad guys in a chase sequence.  The 2000 GT comes across as the kind of 
vehicle that both capable and good looking females drive, as well as one that even James 
Bond, a suave ladies man, could enjoy.  Not only would it appeal to males, who would 
want to look as dashing as 007, but also some females who would like to mimic the style 
of the beautiful and competent spy Aki. 
The company launched its first slogan in 1967, running it until the 1970s.  This 
theme, “Get your hands on a Toyota and you’ll never let go,” was popular and came from 
an actual customer’s comment.  This slogan works well, especially when analyzing it 
from the reverse strategy test.  Reversing the slogan gives you “Get your hands on a Ford 
(or GM or Volkswagen) and you will let go.”  The fact that this slogan is based on a 
customer comment also tends to lend credibility, at least for the consumer.  If some 
customer felt that strongly about the vehicle, then it must be a good purchase! 
Toyota’s Print Advertisements 
Toyota’s early advertising was limited to specific markets and regions.  Because 
the company only sold a restricted number of vehicles in precise areas, the company 
advertised in those areas only.  This localized marketing enabled Toyota to save money 
on their advertising budget and work to build relations with consumers and dealers to 
prepare for future moves.  In the earliest ads, Toyota’s goal was to introduce their vehicle 
specifically to potential buyers rather than to make grand assertions about their company 
or the cars.   
One of the first ads Toyota released in the United States was for their 1959 




pearls behind the vehicle.  These pearls served to convey a known meaning, that of 
elegance, to an unknown, the vehicle.  The text highlighted the interior space and the low 
cost, both to purchase and maintain.  It even included the slogan “World’s Greatest 
Automotive Value.”  In fact, the only other word in the ad that was as large as value is 
the name of the car, Toyopet.  The company went as far as to assert that “[t]his is value 
unattained in any other automobile, regardless of price.”  Interestingly enough, the strand 
of pearls was the largest object in the ad, while the vehicle was centered slightly to the 
lower end of the ad.  It was the pearls that communicate the value of the car.  While they 
may not be diamonds, pearls can be just as elegant, and a strand of pearls is said to make 
any dress elegant.  The ad, then, conveyed a sense of elegance.  Buy this car, and it will 
be like buying a strand of pearls.  You will have the beauty and elegance of larger cars 
(diamonds) for a lower price (pearls).  And of course have money left over! 
Another early ad was for the Toyopet Crown Custom Station Wagon.  The ad was 
meant to appeal to families, with its mention of a roomy interior and extra space.  It even 
utilized the theme of a vacation, with a dog and what appear to be a young boy in the 
front seat, and some suitcases in the back.  The company highlighted the vehicle as 
serving dual purposes, “the double duty,” which can include a beach trip or towing 
capability.  One of the most striking features of the ad was that it attempts to place itself 
in the same category as other imported luxury vehicles.  Looking at the ad, you can see 
the message that if you buy this vehicle, not only will you have family vacations, but 
your child will actually be looking forward to these trips.  Additionally you are making a 




Automobiles.”  All other vehicles are not only dumb, and their owners by extension, but 
not capable of functioning for more than one task. 
The earliest ad for the Land Cruiser vehicle featured it completing a climb up a 
hill on some kind of off-road adventure.  Besides the vehicle, the only other words were 
the name of the car, the company, and the horsepower of the Cruiser.  This type of ad 
would appeal to those looking for a vehicle to handle the rough roads of the outdoors, or 
at least give the appearance as such.  The Land Cruiser looked almost like an army jeep.  
Such a vehicle would easily appeal to men who want to appear manly and rugged, 
following the same vein as the Marlboro Cowboy. 
The ad for the 1960 Tiara featured another interesting concept.  On the right hand 
side of the ad, there was a color picture of a young person playing golf.  One of the 
captions read that the Tiara has ample trunk space, enough to hold golf clubs and several 
suitcases.  The ad mentioned that the trunk was larger than what is found on many other 
vehicles.  It then described the easy opening and closing of the trunk, the benefits of the 
“canted center pillar” which made it easier to open the door, and the fact that the gas cap 
was behind the license plate.  Clearly, owning the car was one step in the path to 
becoming successful, successful enough to play golf, as well as to store your clubs and 
suitcases in the trunk.  Buying the vehicle might even improve your game, as the person 
golfing has just hit a ball that was heading towards the hole. 
In 1965, Toyota had an attractive line of products available to hit the market.  One 
ad played on that line, and announced the vehicles “[f]rom the world’s most modern 
automotive plant.”  The word modern was especially important, as Toyota had in fact, 




Owning a Toyota, therefore, was to own a modern car, not one of those old and outdated 
vehicles that “other” people drove.  The ad then mentioned the popularity of the Land 
Cruiser, stating that not only is it available in 78 countries, but that this vehicle was 
“recognized as the world’s toughest, fastest and most powerful of 4-wheel drives.”  These 
terms are all subjective, as what is tough or fast or powerful may be different depending 
on the person asked.  The slogan for this ad stated “the tough ones come from Toyota.”  
Reversing that slogan would imply that the other companies, such as Ford or GM, don’t 
make tough vehicles.  And if they don’t make touch vehicles, what do they make?  And 
what does that say about you?  By driving a Toyota, according to the ad, you were a 
rugged individual, a cowboy or frontiersman if you like.  In addition to a number of 
different Land Cruiser models, Toyota included two models of the Crown, the Corona, 
and the Stout.  And in case you did not want a rugged vehicle, the ad also mentioned that 
the passenger cars have “outstanding beauty and power.”  All of those “other” cars, and 
by extension the people that own them, are ugly and weak.  Toyota owners, if you 
followed the logic of the ad, were tough, powerful, modern, and beautiful (or handsome). 
By 1967, Toyota had more models and awards to mention in their ads.  One ad 
from this year featured the Toyota 2000 GT and the Corona.  The GT was noted for its 
speed records, and the Corona for being the “‘Hottest of Imports.’”  The print explained 
that the Corona has increased Toyota’s sales and position from simply being one among 
many, to fourth or higher depending on the list. 
Competitor Print Advertisements 
 Toyota was not alone in the American market.  Besides competing against the 




from around the globe.  Several of these companies, like Volkswagen or Fiat, penetrated 
the market before Toyota hit the shores.  To properly examine Toyota’s advertisements, 
therefore, it is important to study several competitors to show how Toyota attempted to 
either set itself apart, or blend in with other companies. 
Time reported that in 1958, Buick moved to a new advertising agency.  Before 
1958, their advertising was rather successful.  In the hands of Kudner Agency, Buick 
went from “selling fewer than 100,000 cars a year” to “third place in 1954 (513,497 
sales),” placing Buick just behind Ford and Chevrolet.  Kudner was responsible for 
slogans, used in many print ads, that were catchy and appealing: “Better Buy Buick” 
“Hot?  It’s a Fireball” and “When better cars are built, Buick will build them.”  However, 
Kudner did not do well with television ads, and sales began to slip.100  Buick eventually 
picked McCann-Erickson, and that company dropped their account with Chrysler to 
move to Buick, in hopes of courting other General Motors accounts.101  By April, Kudner 
was off all of GM’s accounts.102 
 One of the most surprising competitor ads in 1958 was for La Dauphine by 
Renault.  La Dauphine was even written in a script font, to make it seem even more 
French and exquisite.  The main feature that Renault announced was that their vehicle 
was “4-Door, 4-passenger, over 40 miles per gallon!”  In the smaller print, the ad 
continues with “...the finest low-cost way to beat today’s high cost of driving!  
Distinctively French…and, feature for feature unexcelled in its field.”  The company was 
playing to consumers who would want to look refined and cultured by emphasizing the 
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country of origin.  But price would also be a concern to some drivers, as noted in the ad 
with the high cost of driving.  Buying a Renault, therefore, could lower their cost, as this 
car achieved “over 40 miles per gallon!”  What a deal! 
 Another ad for the same vehicle portrays it as a fun car to own.  The picture 
showed a large group of people gathering at a large body of water to fish.  The slogan 
pushed this angle stating, in a font made to look like handwriting, “made in France to 
make driving fun again!”  It is complete with a lipstick-smeared kiss for accent.  At the 
top, the ad pushed even more French at the consumer “le plus=the most!”  This vehicle 
was “the most fun” has “the most mileage per gallon” with “the most comfort” in “the 
most smallest” and “most versatile” all at “the most lowest cost” for “the most immediate 
delivery!”  So, not only would the consumer invest in “the most chic” vehicle, they 
would also have a great deal with plenty of comfort and amenities, and save money on 
gas. 
 By contrast, Buick launched a series of ads for their new vehicle, the Limited.  
Even the name conveyed a sense of elegance and importance.  This vehicle was limited, 
and therefore special!  The phrase served to remind the consumer of the “limited special 
edition” frequently used for items of limited production, making them not only special 
but seem expensive and high class.  Each ad pushed the focus on comfort and luxury.  
The vehicle was so limited and important, and large, that it requires a full two-page ad!  
In one ad, a group of men who look like old nobility or at least members of the upper 
class, dressed in fancy suits complete with top hats, seem to be admiring the new 
Limited.  In another, a young woman on horseback comes up beside the car to admire its 




Automobile.”  Even the text that accompanies the ads appealed to those looking to appear 
classy, ending with suggestions that the consumer make an appointment for a “personal 
inspection and demonstration” as “your Buick dealer will be understandably proud to 
introduce you to” the Limited. 
Conclusions 
 As Toyota entered a market filled with large cars from the American 
manufacturers and dominated by European vehicles in the compact-car area, they not 
only had to introduce their products, but attempt to carve out their own consumer base. 
Their early advertisements sought to introduce the public to the Toyota vehicles and 
models.  After building a small customer base, the company was able to launch a larger 
campaign, although in a limited area.  In 1967, Toyota increased its exposure with the 
2000 GT appearing in You Only Live Twice as well as their slogan “Get Your Hands on a 
Toyota and You’ll Never Let Go.” 
 Compared with their competitors, Toyota seemed to do little to set itself apart 
stylistically, both in the substance of the ad and in the target markets.  Unlike 
Volkswagen and its famous “Think Small” campaign, Toyota did not use creativity to 
break into the American market.  Instead, their ads are similar to contemporary 
competitor advertisements, such as the Buick Limited series.  Not all of their 
advertisements are loaded with information either, but the majority contained enough 
print to inform consumers about Toyota vehicles.  Nonetheless, neither Buick, 
Volkswagen nor Renault, and probably not even Toyota itself, could have envisioned 





STEADY: TOYOTA’S EXPANSION INTO THE AMERICAN MARKET 
 By 1970, Toyota had established itself as an alternative automobile for the 
average consumer.  Moreover, the company had met what would be their first goal in 
America – to establish themselves and grab some kind of share, no matter how small, in 
the market.  In fact, Toyota was the second largest automobile importer in the United 
States, just behind Volkswagen.  Their next goal would be to set themselves apart from 
the competition.  The economically turbulent 1970s would provide the perfect ground to 
make the transition. 
 At first, Toyota sought to set itself as a contrast to other imports, both from Japan 
and those from Europe.  This task proved to be easier than first imagined, especially as 
more and more Americans flocked to purchase smaller cars.  Toyota’s sales not only 
increased, enabling the advertising budget to increase, but word-of-mouth and favorable 
reviews aided Toyota’s exposure.  Indeed, amid such success, as early as 1971, many 
American industries feared the Japanese industrial powerhouse.  Some even started 
calling the country “Japan, Inc.” in response to its rapid rise from post-war destruction, 
like a phoenix being reborn from the ashes.  More and more, Japan was something that 
American industry was beginning to fear and face in the market.  Being dubbed “the 
Japanese miracle,” Japan was now the third most productive economy in the world, 
behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. 
 Japanese industries, at this time, had to deal with rising protectionism in the 
United States.  The same is true for those looking from the American perspective.  In 




received from their government.  Especially irksome was the policy of the Japanese 
government to close “its domestic economy to many foreign goods and most foreign 
capital investment.”  The automobile industry, especially, felt the blows.  “Ford and 
Chrysler have been delayed for years in attempts to buy into the booming Japanese auto 
industry, and General Motors has won permission for only a limited investment.”103 
 Part of the reason for the success of Japan and Japanese businesses came from 
their own government.  The Japanese government was willing to support businesses, and 
gave money to sectors that they, via MITI, marked for priority.  But more importantly, it 
would seem, the Japanese automobile industry was able to respond quickly to external 
threats and consumer desires.  But even more important and helpful were the conditions 
facing the automobile industry.  The response of the Japanese manufacturers, and the 
general trends they set, helped them as the industry dealt with a number of unpredictable 
attacks.  From the environmental standards to the oil shortages to inflation, the markets 
became highly unstable during this tumultuous period. 
Toyota Vehicles 
 Toyota’s sales in 1969 were 130,044 vehicles in the United States alone.  
American manufacturers began to notice the increase in sales of imports and made an 
attempt to halt their progress.  Nonetheless, despite the huge differences in number of 
dealerships (almost 10 to 1 against Toyota), Toyota managed to increase sales to 208,000 
in 1970 and to almost 310,000 in 1971.  These skyrocketing numbers troubled the 
Detroit-based companies, and with a sudden surcharge on imports and a dock strike in 
                                                 




1971, prices on Toyota vehicles increased.  Toyota had to turn to advertising to set itself 
apart as more than just the most affordable vehicle in its class.104  
 By 1971, Toyota had the highest-ranked car in its class, according to Consumer 
Reports, which called this class of cars subcompact.  At the time mainly foreign vehicles 
dominated this group.  Although domestic manufacturers sought to break in, by 1971 
most had not fared well.  Toyota had three vehicles ranked by Consumer Reports in this 
class with the Toyota Corona Mark II at the top of the list followed shortly by the Datsun 
510 and the Fiat 124B.  It is not until fourth place that a domestic maker scored a hit with 
the Chevrolet Vega, and even then, it was tied with two other vehicles - the Opel 1900 
and the Toyota Corona.105 
 The problems that Consumer Reports found with Toyota’s vehicles were common 
with most of the other vehicles in the subcompact class.  They were loud, or they did not 
handle as well on bumpy roads, or there was not enough leg-room or space in the back 
seat of the vehicle.  The company corrected some of the problems they found with earlier 
models.  For example, a sample of the Toyota Corolla 1200 in 1971 shows some of the 
following trends: 
 Pedal efforts were moderate… 
In normal driving, the car responded predictably and fairly quickly to its steering.  
Neither bumps nor crosswinds pushed the Corolla far off course.  Directional 
stability and normal handling were good… 
That change in the car’s attitude was controllable, though, and we judged the 
emergency handling fair-to-good… 
We judged the Corolla’s light-load ride poor-to fair.  The incessant buzz of the 
engine and the road roar made the Corolla noisy… 
We judged the rear-seat comfort poor… 
Our Corolla arrived with only 12 defects – about half the average number for cars 
that CU has tested this year – and most were minor.106 
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Compared with other vehicles they tested, some of the complaints were indeed minor. 
The Chevrolet Vega was cited as having horrible ground clearance.  “With no one in the 
car, a scant five inches separated the exhaust system from the road.  With a full load, 
clearance dropped to 3.8 inches.  During our pre-test driving, the engine oil pan (0.2 
inches higher than the exhaust system) struck the road several times; that should never 
happen.”107 
Competitor Vehicles 
 Toyota faced stiff competition in the American market.  Toyo Kogyo Co. Ltd., the 
company that makes Mazda, bought the rights to produce the Wankel engine in the 
1960s.  This novel engine, designed in Germany, swapped cylinders and pistons with a 
triangular rotor that rotated in a figure eight shaped combustion chamber.  More 
importantly, this engine was easy to alter to meet the 1975 standards for automobile 
emissions in the United States.  While Mazdas were more expensive than other similar 
cars, some consumers enjoyed the “jackrabbit speed and smooth riding.  The Mazda can 
accelerate from zero to 60 in 12 sec., and the faster the car is driven, at least up to 100 
m.p.h., the quieter it sounds to passengers.”108 
 In 1970, U.S. consumers bought over one million imported vehicles, for over 14 
percent of the market.  Small car sales accounted for 33 percent of all automobile sales in 
the United States at that time.  American companies hoped to hold the number of imports 
sold at that number, but in January of 1971, 15.5 percent of all vehicles sold in America 
were imports.  In fact, the Japanese made the most gains.  “Toyota’s U.S. sales in January 
[of 1971] almost doubled from the level of the previous year to 20,016 cars; Datsun’s 
                                                 




almost tripled to 13,610.”  While American manufacturers were producing small cars to 
compete with the imports, these cars did not sell well.  As Time Magazine reported, some 
argued that “Detroit did not make its subcompacts quite good enough or cheap enough to 
win over the majority of import buyers.”  Some consumers still preferred the American 
models, though, for Detroit did sell some subcompacts.  American manufacturers even 
released a few more automobiles to that market in 1971, including the Pontiac Ventura II, 
a second model of the Ford Pinto, along with the preexisting Chevrolet Vega and the 
American Motors Gremlin.109 
 Lincoln-Mercury went through an overhaul of its products in the late 1960s, with 
new models out in 1967-68, and sales picking up shortly afterwards.  In the wake of the 
failed Edsel, Lincoln-Mercury had little to offer the consumer until these new models 
debuted.  Soon, the new Cougar outsold Pontiac’s Firebird, and the new Continental 
Mark III “picked up 19 percent of the luxury-car market, which was once the all but 
exclusive preserve of Cadillac.”  The president of the company, Ben Bidwell, eagerly 
watched their growth and enjoyed selling what he believed the consumers wanted.  “’You 
can’t bull the public about cars.  All the pizzazz in the world can’t hide an ineffective 
dealer organization or a poor product… Little cars and luxury cars are selling well, … 
and we happen to be one of the few division that have both.’”110  Lincoln-Mercury’s 
success was remarkable, but it would not be able to recover to its former glory with 
import sales on the rise. 
 Sales for the compact sports vehicles dropped in 1971 compared to sales of the 
same vehicles in 1968.  These cars, such as the Ford Mustang, Pontiac Firebird and 
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Chevrolet Camaro, contributed to a subculture of music and television in the 1960s.  At 
their height these vehicles accounted for 11 percent of the market.  For the model year 
1971, they dropped to 5 percent, and the last months of 1971 their sales accounted for 3.9 
percent.  The vice-president of Chrysler commented about the changing preferences of 
American consumers:  “‘The emphasis now is on practicality, quality and convenience, 
and it is the young people who are leading the parade.’”  The sports vehicles suffered 
from an increase in price, size, and insurance premiums, making them slightly less 
desirable.111 
One of the most common concerns for drivers was safety.  Consumer Reports 
concluded, in January and September of 1971, that it was difficult to tell how safe these 
smaller vehicles were: 
A preliminary report on a large-scale accident study by the State of New York 
concludes that the likelihood of severe injury or death increases as car weight 
goes down.  Apparently, also, small sedans become involved in more one-car 
accidents and more rollovers than larger cars.  However, those statistics are 
cooled by the fact that a great proportion of the subcompacts in those studies were 
pre-1968 Volkswagen Beetles.  Because of their design, those Beetles tend to spin 
out and roll over more easily than many other small cars.112 
 
But these cars could still be safe, if properly handled.  While there might have been more 
risk for a smaller car, such as the ones Toyota offered, there were benefits, such as 
greater fuel efficiency, frequently lower insurance, and a lower overall cost to purchase. 
 When compared with vehicles sold in the United States, Toyota was in the top 
five in fuel efficiency in 1973.  According to results issued by the EPA, the Datsun 1200 
topped the list, followed by the Volkswagen Sedan, the Chevrolet Vega, the Ford Pinto 
and the Toyota Corolla.  Each of these vehicles averaged over 20 miles per gallon.  
                                                                                                                                                 
110 Time, “Up from Edsel,” August 2, 1971, p. 59. 




American vehicles dominated the bottom of the list: the Chrysler Imperial, the Plymouth 
Fury, the Oldsmobile 98 and the Cadillac Eldorado.  But the least efficient was the 
Ferrari 365 that averaged 6.3 miles per gallon, although those that could afford a Ferrari 
more than likely did not care about fuel-efficiency.113 
 In the midst of the 1973 oil crisis, sales of larger vehicles shrunk while small car 
sales took off.  Standard sized models by companies such as Ford and General Motors for 
the first time lost to the smaller cars, such as the Chevy Vega, the Ford Pinto, the AMC 
Gremlin and the Dodge Dart.  Consumers were buying these smaller vehicles faster than 
the companies could make them.  And to make matters worse, for the Big Three, 
consumers were not buying the larger vehicles and total sales in 1974 were down some 
25 percent from the previous year.  American Motors, on the other hand, was doing well, 
and had sales that were 21 percent higher than 1973 sales.  The Big Three rushed to 
develop new small car models, although most would not be ready for at least another full 
year.  These companies also started to add more luxury to the smaller models, which 
pushed up the prices, but consumers bought “cars plain and fancy, low and high-priced – 
anything as long as it [was] small.”114 
 By March 1974, AMC was doing even better.  Sales of its five vehicles, the 
Gremlin, Hornet, Javelin, Ambassador and Matador, were up 16 percent from 1973.  In 
all, AMC jumped from a 3.8 percent market share to 6.7 percent in 1974.  While GM and 
Ford had rather large stockpiles of inventory, enough to stop making cars and have 
supplies last for the next five months, AMC had a 17-day supply of their Gremlin.  
Profits for the last quarter of 1973 decreased for the Big Three, 22 percent at GM, 12 
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percent at Chrysler and a startling 76 percent at Ford, but AMC’s profits increased 22 
percent.  And while the other American companies laid off workers, around 85,000 total, 
AMC had to hire new workers for its plant in Wisconsin.  One of the main reasons for 
AMC’s success was that in 1967, the company decided to focus on small cars.  By 1974, 
70 percent of AMC’s sales were for their smaller vehicles.  The company also decreased 
the number of dealers, eliminating those that did not sell many cars.  In 1971, they 
introduced a Buyer Protection Plan for 12,000 miles or 12 months, as well as deciding to 
pay for any defects that could be traced to the company.115 
 For 1975 models, Ford introduced the Granada and Mercury Monarch, what then 
president Lee Iacocca called “the biggest small cars the company has ever made.”  These 
cars were bigger and heavier than the Mercedes 280, and both Ford vehicles averaged 14 
mpg in the city.  The two cars were priced between $3,600 and $6,000, and offered what 
the consumer desired: modest size and luxury.  GM also planned a new Cadillac that 
would be shorter than previous models and cost around $10,000, along with a rotary-
powered Vega.  These new vehicles were direct competition with the growing imports.116  
GM also raised prices on most cars, including the Vega, and also increased the price of 
trucks by 10.9 percent, or an average of $624 per vehicle.117 
 By the end of 1974, Detroit sales were in a slump.  While sales did increase in the 
late summer months, when the 1975 models hit showrooms, sales declined.  The average 
cost per vehicle on these models rose an average of $450.  GM’s third-quarter sales of 
1974 fell to a mere $16 million, 94 percent below 1973 numbers.  In response to the 
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slump, some manufacturers planned layoffs.118  With the entire American economy in a 
slump, Detroit men pushed consumers to fight inflation and buy a car.  Some urged that 
buying a new car would help the American economy.  Chrysler was the hardest hit of all 
American manufacturers, with third-quarter profits at a loss of $8 million.  In response, 
Chrysler planned to temporarily close all but one of its plants.  With decreasing sales, 
dealers and manufactures offered higher deals and more money for trade-ins.119 
Ralph Nader and the Continued Campaign for Safety 
 Ralph Nader didn’t just push for new safety and pollution standards in America, 
he also visited Japan in 1971 and talked to a number of audiences about a variety of 
issues, including the automobile industry and pollution.  He encouraged Japanese citizens 
to speak out, especially for the sake of their environment.  In a talk with the Prime 
Minister, Eisaku Sato, Nader suggested “that cars sold in Japan should have the same 
safety devices – seat belts, headrests, dual braking systems – that are put on models 
exported to the U.S.”  He also pushed for the companies to recall automobiles in Japan 
that they recalled in the U.S.120 
 Nader wasn’t the only person pushing for safety.  The Institute for Highway 
Safety also researched automobiles.  In 1971 this agency tested small cars from each 
American manufacturer against larger models.  For example, they tested a Chevrolet 
Vega and an Impala.  The test results clearly showed the safety advantage of a larger 
vehicle: 
In some crashes, the small car was smashed into a pile of twisted junk barely 
recognizable as an auto, while the bigger car sustained relatively moderate 
damage.  In the Chevrolet crash, a dummy placed in the Impala only struck its 
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head against the dashboard, but the dummy in the Vega was beheaded by a 
section of the hood that was hurled back through the windshield. 
 
The group did not test any foreign automobiles in this study, but they did report that the 
percent killed or injured in accidents increased as the weight of the vehicle decreased.121 
 In December of 1971, General Motors announced a recall on over 6.7 million cars 
and trucks.  Investigations by both Nader and the National Highway Traffic and Safety 
Administration came from complaints by consumers that Chevrolet engines from 1965 
through 1969 “were twisting loose from car frames, sometimes with the frightening result 
that the auto’s accelerator pedal was pulled all the way down to the floor and the brakes 
failed.”  The problem was that many of those engines had “a rubberized layer between 
two pieces of metal on the mounts has deteriorated, loosening the entire assembly.”122   
 As of 1972, the government required all new vehicles sold in the United States “to 
have a warning system that included a buzzer that screamed at the driver and front seat 
passengers until they had fastened their seat belt.”  Many motorists got around that 
system, some by simply buckling the belt and then sitting on it. Despite the advantages of 
wearing a seat-belt, many motorists rejected government interference in their driving.  In 
1974, the Department of Transportation “made it nearly impossible to start a car unless 
the driver 1) sat down in the seat, 2) fastened the seat belt and 3) turned the ignition key – 
in that proper sequence.” 123  This law was unpopular with motorists and manufacturers 
alike, and eventually these requirements were reduced to a light on the dashboard and a 
short warning buzz, but nothing that would prevent a driver from starting the vehicle. 
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 Automobile manufacturers also had to fight possible interference regarding 
airbags.  In 1974, the Department of Transportation wanted to make them mandatory on 
all cars starting in 1977.  However, Congress disagreed and passed an amendment that 
would only require air bags to be an option offered to consumers.  These bags would add 
to the price of a car, with estimates suggesting as much as $200 more added to the cost to 
the consumer.124 
Protecting the Environment 
 One of the first hurdles facing the automobile industry was meeting the new 
Environmental Protection Agency’s standards for clean air.  The EPA, formed in 1970, 
had considerable power in creating stringent goals for the industry to meet.  The agency 
had to enforce the standards set forth in the Clean Air Act of 1970.  The act was a two-
pronged attack on both automobiles and industries for abuses to the environment.  
Specifically, the act stated that the emissions of the three major harmful gasses – carbon 
monoxide, hydrocarbons, and nitrogen oxide - be cut at least by at least 90 percent by 
1975 for the first two and 1976 for nitrogen oxide.  Manufacturers could apply for a one 
year-extension, and the EPA could fine violators if necessary.125   
 The EPA issued the testing instructions for emissions during the summer of 1971.  
According the both the EPA and the American automobile companies, these tests would 
make it easier to reach the targets set for 1976 models.  The old testing method started 
with a cold engine, which would give off more pollutants than a warm engine:   
To approximate more closely the way a typical car is used during a day (the engine is 
often already warm from a previous trip), the new rules call for tests from warm 
to cold starts; this procedure should reduce the average emissions during tests. 
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Also, the test fuel would be unleaded, which “does not foul antipollution equipment; thus, 
the engineering problems of the automakers will be eased.”126 
 As early as 1971, the U.S. auto manufacturers complained about the restrictions, 
stating that they would not be able to meet them on time.  By 1972, most U.S. 
manufacturers appealed for an extension of the deadline in meeting the 1975 standards.  
The EPA, in turn, “gave the auto industry an extra year to meet the full, rigid 
requirements of the law, but set interim standards so tough that Detroit’s reaction was 
immediate and angry anyway.”127  The industry’s solution, the catalytic converter, was 
not reliable enough to solve the problems, yet still added at to the cost of the vehicle. 
One of the industry’s complaints was that “[b]etween the 1962 and the 1970 
models… Detroit cut carbon-monoxide emissions by 70 percent and hydrocarbons by 90 
percent.”  The further cutting only caused more problems for the industry, and the costs 
of the research would be passed to the consumers.  The solution that most planned to use, 
the catalytic converter, increased nitrogen oxide while reducing carbon monoxide and 
hydrocarbons.128  As part of the emissions requirements, nitrogen oxide was one of the 
gases companies needed to reduce. 
 The EPA, flexing its power, took Ford to court on charges of employees 
“deliberately tamper[ing] with 1973 model cars in order to make them seem less 
polluting than they actually were.”  The EPA won a court case for $3,500,000, plus 
another $3,500,000 on counts settled out of court.129 
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 Honda was the first automobile manufacturer to develop technology to meet the 
standards.  By 1973, the company had “plans to begin exporting to the U.S. a 1,600-lb. 
four-seat car that will easily meet the 1975 emission standards.”  Their new engine would 
produce a “more complete combustion in the engine’s cylinders and the reduction of 
polluting exhaust gases escaping from the tail pipe.” 130  When tested, this new engine 
easily met the standards set by the EPA.  In fact, under EPA testing in Michigan, 
“Honda’s four-cylinder engines, using no catalysts, afterburners or other extra emission-
reducing devises posted pollution counts well below EPA ceilings even after running for 
50,000 miles.”131 
Honda’s alternative, as the engineers pointed out, was unlike the solution that the 
majority of engines, both American and foreign, will need because the larger vehicles 
require expensive alternatives such as catalytic converters or thermal reactors.132  This 
new engine was not powerful enough for larger models, especially those made by 
American manufacturers.  However, in some of the smaller models, such as General 
Motor’s Vega, “the Honda engines gave better than average [gas] mileage in the EPA 
tests.” 133  
Even before the clean air standards, however, American companies faced 
government regulation in other areas of protecting the environment.  As early as 1899 the 
U.S. government had decided to take a stand against water pollution with the Refuse Act.   
This act “requires polluters to obtain permits to discharge wastes into navigable 
waterways.”  Since the act was still in place, all American industries had to follow that 
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law, in addition to the acts to clean the air.  So, in 1963, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers ordered General Motors to build a treatment facility for its waste at a plant in 
New York.  By 1971, the company had yet to build the plant, and an ambitious employee 
for the U.S. Attorney decided to bring GM to court.  The company “accepted a consent 
decree from a U.S. district court” where they “agreed to stop pouring noxious wastes into 
the Hudson [River] until its treatment facility starts operating” later in the year.134 
Once the 1973 oil crisis hit the United States, the new environmental laws fell by 
the wayside.  Many of the automobile, and other industrial, companies lobbied Congress 
to curb these acts so companies could save on oil and energy as many of the changes 
required to meet the air standards reduced fuel efficiency.   After the oil crisis, the EPA 
required almost half of the gas stations in the United States to offer unleaded fuel by July 
1 1974, which would be indispensable for most 1975 model cars.  While more expensive, 
unleaded worked best with the new catalytic converters required to meet the standards set 
by the Clean Air Act.135 
The First Oil Crisis 
 The oil crisis did not just happen one day; it was something that had been building 
for a few years before coming to a head in October 1973.136  In March 1971, the Middle 
Eastern oil countries decided to increase prices, which would make prices rise in Europe 
and Japan.  The United States, however, would not experience the same levels of price 
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increase as only 3 percent of US oil imports came from the Middle East.137  Such a crisis 
would have far-reaching consequences for a number of industries, but especially the 
automobile companies.  Price increases would also hurt consumers, and they would be 
likely to turn to products that were both energy and fuel-efficient.   
 There were several other factors leading up to the 1973 crisis that aggravated the 
problem.  In 1971, the U.S. averted a crisis, in part due to a labor strike at General 
Motors, as well as a recession in the economy as a whole.  Differing government policies 
restricted the development of alternative energy sources:   
By administering oil import quotas, the Interior Department, for example, helps to 
keep domestic oil prices high, the Federal Power Commission tires to protect 
consumers by keeping natural gas prices low.  The unintended result has been to 
discourage exploration for gas, a relatively nonpolluting fuel, because it is only 
one-third as profitable as oil when it is pumped out of the ground.138 
 
Such policies would only increase U.S. dependence on oil, and thus forcing the country 
into a position where any shortage of the fuel could likely cripple the country. 
 In early 1973, the average American began to notice the increasing tensions in the 
Middle East.  Some began to predict a conflict that might ultimately have far-reaching 
consequences for the Western nations.  This conflict came to a head in with the start of 
the Yom Kippur War in October.  The war began with an attacked on Israeli holdings in 
the Sinai and Golan Heights by both Egypt and Syria.  At first, tensions between the 
United States and all of the Middle East did not materialize, until President Nixon asked 
Congress to send arms to Israel   By the 17th, the nations of OPEC declared that it would 
not ship to countries supporting Israel in the conflict.  For the next several months OPEC 
cut their output and exports.  By May of 1974, most of the embargoes ended. 
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 The main reason for the scare in the early months of 1973 developed from a 
growing trend of reliance on imported oil.  For some years, the United States had enough 
excess oil to export.  However, as domestic consumption grew, more and more oil came 
from outside sources.  Indeed, the U.S. received 16 percent of its crude oil from outside 
the country in 1970 and by the first half of 1973 that percent jumped to 23.5 percent.  To 
make matters worse, from a political standpoint, countries that the United States 
traditionally relied on for oil (Venezuela and Canada) were experiencing their own 
shortages.139   
 By November the situation for the United States, much of Western Europe and 
Japan was grave.  Besides cutting overall production, more countries joined the ban of 
exporting oil to the United States, and a number also banned exports to the 
Netherlands.140  The cut in production reduced U.S. supplies by 10 percent, or between 
1,500,000 bbl. to 2,000,000 bbl. a day.  To further aggravate problems, Canada, 
Venezuela and Nigeria increased prices on their oil exports to the United States.141   
 Fuel for vehicles was not the only area hit by the crisis, as petroleum is necessary 
for many products, including chemicals, paints, plastics and synthetic textiles as well as 
oil to operate machinery at factories.  The automobile industry would need to find a 
substitute for plastic, which, ironically, is a substitute material.  Prices increased in other 
areas, as well, such as electricity, housing materials, as well as fuel for airlines and public 
transportation.142 
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 Throughout late October and early November the political situation worsened.  
Many Arab countries embargoed all oil shipments to the United States and the 
Netherlands in retaliation for their support of Israel.  A total of ten countries decreased 
production.  All declared to continue the pressure “until Israel withdraws behind its 1967 
borders and settles the Palestinian refugees claims for land or money – or both.”  
President Nixon pleaded for the American public to cut back on their oil consumption by 
turning down their thermostats, both at home and work.  Many states and companies 
responded to the call by reducing the speed limits on roads or cutting off their outdoor 
advertising lights.143 
 Between 1971 and January 1, 1974, oil prices per barrel rapidly increased.  In 
1971, the minimum price per barrel for oil from Texas was $4.75, Saudi Arabia $3.40 
and Venezuela $2.90.  By 1973 the minimums had increased to $5.05 for Texas, $4.00 
for Saudi Arabia and $3.50 for Venezuela.  January 1, 1974 prices were staggering: $7.60 
for Texas, Saudi Arabia’s oil was $10.30 and Venezuela was at $10.50.  American oil 
consumption continued to increase over those years, even though domestic production 
peaked and stabilized, forcing the country to turn to imports.  But despite the shortage 
and rising prices, some Americans continued to live their usual lifestyle.  Others did 
partake in voluntary conservation methods, such as driving slower or lowering their 
thermostats.  The shortage was also held off, in part, by a warm fall and winter, making 
heating less of a problem than originally expected.144 
 By February of 1974 six states and some larger cities adopted some form of oil 
rationing.  Most prescribed to the odd-even license plate number method, where those 
                                                 
143 Time, “The Arab’s New Oil Squeeze: Dimouts, Slowdowns, Chills,” November 19, 1973, pp. 88-89. 




people who had a license plate number that ended with an even number could fill up on 
even days.  Some areas made it mandatory for consumers to purchase a minimum 
amount, usually equal to about half a tank or $3.  The U.S. refineries were operating at a 
lower level than normal, and imported oil dropped in the last weeks of February.  Vast 
numbers of Americans still drove to work in their own vehicles, forgoing carpools and 
public transportation.145   
 In the early months of 1974, the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed to be coming to an 
end.  The embargo ended a few months later, with the first shipments of Arab oil arriving 
by May 1974.  Until those shipments arrived, however, the shortage continued and prices 
rose.  In the wake of the end of the embargo, consumers immediately started to return to 
their old habits.  Many ignored the 55-m.p.h. speed limits, others bought larger vehicles, 
and others stopped using the mass transit systems.146 
Toyota’s Specific Advertisement Strategies 
Toyota used a series of slogans during this time period.  Starting in 1970, Toyota 
launched the “We’re Quality Oriented” campaign.  This slogan was clearly effective for a 
number of reasons.  Using the reverse strategy test to describe a competitor, Ford or 
General Motors or even Nissan, this slogan suggested that they would not be quality 
oriented.  If they weren’t quality oriented, then what were they?  And why would any 
consumer want to buy from them? 
Another slogan, “Small car specialists for 40 years,” ran for a number of years, 
starting in the early 1970s.  The reverse strategy test shows that this slogan was not as 
effective as others that Toyota used, but it did emphasize a few interesting features.  The 
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first was the inclusion of time – 40 years.  This made Toyota seem durable and reputable, 
especially when compared with other companies increasingly exposed by Consumer 
Reports as less reliable.  The phrase “small car” clearly emphasized Toyota’s strength in 
the subcompact market.  Finally, by using the word “specialists”, Toyota was attempting 
to set themselves apart from the other companies that made small cars.  The implication 
was that these others were not specialists, and therefore following the logic of the ad, 
their cars were not as valuable or dependable.  Concurrently with the “small car 
specialists” slogan, Toyota used, “See how much car your money can buy.”  Often, this 
slogan appeared alongside the “small car specialists” to emphasize both durability and 
price in Toyota.  Purchasing a Toyota could give customers a quality vehicle at an 
affordable price. 
Due to unforeseen circumstances in 1971, including a surcharge on imports and a 
dock strike, Toyota’s price increased.  To counter negative reactions from consumers, 
Toyota prepared new advertising once the prices of their vehicles stabilized in early 1972.  
Some of these “pointed toward telling the consumer once again that you could buy a 
Toyota for under $2,000.”  Toyota, at that point, decided to “not make head-on 
comparison claims against anyone.  Instead, [they] would continue to sell Toyota as a 
quality product and an outstanding value.”   After these re-introduction ads, Toyota 
planned to focus on “all the extra features included in Toyota that are not included in the 
basic prices of most Detroit and European competition.”147 
In the summer of 1973, Toyota decided to hold a special seven-week campaign 
incorporating the theme “Only Toyota Offers You Both.”  This campaign would use a 




wanted to highlight gas mileage and “other Toyota advantages such as style, the lowest 
sticker price in its class in America and the biggest engine in the small-truck field.”  To 
prepare for this campaign, an independent organization, Ogden Technology Laboratories, 
Inc., tested Toyota vehicles for “over 60,000 total miles in mileage tests” under 
conditions similar to what the average driver would experience.  To reach viewers, the 
company released four new TV commercials utilizing a split-screen technique for the 
Celica, Corolla 1200 and half-ton pickup truck with test results and gas mileage 
appearing on the screen.148 
In preparation for this campaign, Toyota conducted a test survey to see which 
messages the public might enjoy best.  Each message in the test spots stressed a different 
selling point: for example, size, price, feature comparison, reputation, and even a direct 
attack on another import model.  In the end, gas mileage was determined to be the most 
popular theme and became the basis for the new promotion.  One headline for ads in 
magazines read, “Your solution to the gas shortage doesn’t have to be an ugly one.”  To 
take it farther, Toyota emphasized that their vehicles could squeeze “extra miles out of 
the previous gallon” but also give the quality people expect from Toyota, such as styling, 
comfort and performance.149 
Toyota’s Print Advertisements 
 The 1971 Land Cruiser ad played up the rugged and outdoor nature of the vehicle.  
The headline boldly announced, “This is not a car.”  You have enough power to go up a 
large hill or pull heavy objects – just the kind of power someone who wants to appear 
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rugged might want to use.  But if you want, you can also use the vehicle on the highway, 
or to let your wife get the groceries.  “But those are fringe benefits.  They’re not what it 
was built for.”  No, this car was built to do all of the heavy-duty things that manly men, 
real men, would need to do, such as go out to “the land you want to preserve.”  Areas that 
the great heroes of American, like Davy Crockett, might have visited: the wild and 
untamed wilderness, the unexplored American frontier.  The print details all of the 
advantages of the vehicle, from the number of windows to the spare tire.  The Land 
Cruiser is made of steel and is tough, even a “real beauty,” so it comes with features that 
people want – a gas cap with a chain for example.  Toyota dubbed it “an honest machine” 
with an “honest price,” a “beautifully functional 4-wheel drive machine.” 
 The ad for the 1972 Carina poses as giving information about the vehicle.  The 
top third of the ad is devoted to a picture of the car.  Below that, in headline type, 
“Introducing the Toyota Carina.  It might be new to you but we’ve been with it a long 
time.”  The obvious point from this statement is that Toyota has tested the Carina so that 
it is the best vehicle it can be.  Reading the print further supports this belief, with Toyota 
attempting to convince the reader that they indeed put the car through rigorous and 
improbable situations.  “We froze, drenched, buffeted, skidded and crash-tested the 
Carina prototypes without mercy.”  Toyota even lets the reader know why they tested the 
vehicle so much.  “So just in case you don’t show yours much mercy, it’ll be better 
prepared.”  And to prove that they tested it, the ad comes complete with a picture of the 
Carina driving through a giant puddle of water.  The ad then lists all of the features of the 
Carina – the large bumpers, the interior, the engine, a cutting-edge “electric rear window 




quality.”  The ad even explains what quality is, at least for Toyota.  “It’s something you 
work on, sweat over, pound in, rip out, check and re-check.  Until you get what you want.  
Like the Toyota Carina.”  The ad effectively targeted those worried about safety and 
quality, issues the public learned about from both the original and the second edition of 
Nader’s Unsafe at any Speed.  Even if people did not know much about the company, 
they could read about all of the tests that Toyota claimed to put the car through.  They 
could read about the different features, many not standard on American cars.  The slogan 
even taunts American-made vehicles.  “See how much car your money can buy.” 
 In 1974, Toyota made a special appeal to owners of larger cars with their ad for 
the Toyota Corona.  The emphasis is that big car owners finally “have something to turn 
to,” which was an attractive option given the year 1974 and the gasoline crisis.  Besides 
the usual blurb about the comforts that come with the car, Toyota emphasized the use of 
steel in the design.  According to the ad, “[i]n a test conducted by Nationwide Consumer 
Testing Institute, people gave up their big cars to drive Coronas for three weeks.”  To 
make their car and the test seem even more valuable and special, Toyota appealed to the 
reader by including an opinion from a doctor!  His testimony stated that during the test 
period, he never once wanted a large car.  The ad even included his picture to make it all 
seem more authentic and trustworthy.  No surprise, for after all, the tag slogan reads, 
“Small car specialists for 40 years.” 
 The 1975 Celica GT was a sporty vehicle, which Toyota marketed strategically.  
In one ad, just below the headline introducing the vehicle, the print announced “2.2 liter, 
4-seater, 5-speeder.”  The interior shots of the vehicle at the bottom of the page 




The text detailed all of the things that make the Celica like those other sports cars. Yet, in 
a marketing twist, Toyota proclaimed that the Celica GT was not a sports car, despite its 
looks.  “You see, it was built for people who want a great looking car.  But don’t intend 
spending the rest of their lives paying for it.”  The message: if you can’t afford one of 
those sports cars from the other companies, Toyota can still give you what you want, and 
at a better price.  “See how much car your money can buy.” 
Competitor Print Advertisements 
 Toyota was not the only company, of course, vying for American consumer 
dollars.  Other companies sought to profit from the opportunities presented by the rising 
cost of gasoline.  One example is Subaru, made by Fuji Heavy Industries, Japan.  A 1971 
ad for Subaru boldly compared it to other vehicles in its largest print.  “The Subaru is not 
another Toyota or a different Datsun or a Japanese Beetle or anything like Detroit.  The 
Subaru is $1900* and front wheel drive.”  Of course the catch was that the 2-door is 
$1890.40, and other models were more expensive.  The bulk of the ad was devoted to 
detailing all of the great things about the Subaru, and the consumer was given five 
different views of the vehicle to make these details easier to see.  These compared the 
Subaru with other vehicles (“One small Detroit car has it – but not with our front wheel 
drive”) or added humor (“Ever see a tiny Texan?”) or incorporate customer and 
professional comments (“a desert driving Californian says it’s never once over-heated”).  
Subaru was still just one of many imports, and had not yet set itself apart from the crowd.  





 Another Japanese make, Nissan’s Datsun, emphasized its set price in two 1971 
ads.  The first emphasized price: “$1,990 Stripped” and “$1,990 Loaded.”  The text 
talked about how the Datsun came with all of the extra amenities for free, and the only 
extras the consumer paid “for are tax, license, dealer preparation and local freight.”  The 
ad encouraged the reader to “go ahead.  Take a look at the other ‘under $2,000 cars,’” but 
“Drive a Datsun… then decide.”  The featured 510 2-door sedan encompassed the 
majority of the lower half of the page.  The car was foreshortened, making it appear 
bigger and longer.  The next ad had a large asterisk and the message “Beware the 
asterisk” taking up almost two-thirds of the space.  The text provided with the ad was 
nearly the same, emphasizing the fact that Datsun, presumably more honest, does not 
charge extra for the benefits “bucket seats, tinted glass, front disc brakes” and even a 
radio.  These ads seek to appeal to consumers that want to break away from the 
companies who deceptively post one price, which cover only the most basic items, while 
“extras” cost significantly more. 
 Japan’s American Honda ran a tongue-in-cheek two-page ad in 1973.  On the left 
side was a scene familiar to most motorists – a congested highway.  The title reads “The 
8:40 a.m. Grand Prix.”  Reading the text on the right side, Honda reveals that their Civic 
model “has everything you need to fight the freeways.”  These features “rack-and-pinion 
steering, front disc brakes” and “a peppy overhead cam engine that gets up to 30 miles to 
a gallon of regular.”  In the midst of the first oil crisis, any fuel-efficient car, especially 
one with a high mpg was desirable.  To make their vehicle even more appealing, Honda 
included a long quote from Road Test Magazine praising the vehicle for its comfort and 




morning and afternoon races to work and home.  What is remarkable about this ad is that 
the Honda Civic was not featured clearly or pointed out in the sea of cars. 
 Sweden’s Volvo ran a series of ads that dealt with safety, and how their vehicles 
were the safest ones on the roads.  One of these, read in bold capital face font “It 
shouldn’t take an act of Congress to make cars safe.”  A clear jab at the American 
manufactures, as detailed in Nader’s book, Volvo took advantage of that fear and desire 
for safety.  The print detailed all of the safety features of a Volvo, including their brakes, 
being the first to put safety belts in the cars (9 years ahead of everyone else in fact!), as 
well as padded dashboards (12 years ahead of government requirements!).  The ad ended 
with a series of questions: “Now who would you rather buy a car from?  A company that 
builds a safe car because someone else made them do it?  Or a company that builds a safe 
car because their conscience made them do it?”  In influencing public opinion, this ad is 
appealing for its call for safety. 
Conclusions 
 Although enjoying increased sales, Toyota and other imports still did not hold a 
majority of the total American market.  Overall, small car sales did increase, but the 
public still went for larger vehicles.  With the oil crisis of 1973, small cars in general 
gained ground, but in the lull that followed they were not able to make gains that large 
again.  Nonetheless, the crisis, among other problems the industry faced, did help to 
weaken Detroit. 
 At first, it is surprising that a number of the ads did not continue to mention fuel 
efficiency even after the end of the oil crisis.  While some would mention good mileage 




However, by doing so, the companies, Toyota included, showed the diversity of their 
product and its uses.  Not only would people remember the great mileage from other ads, 
but now they could be exposed to the comfort or quality of a vehicle (as presented in any 
number of delightful pictures, slogans, or catchy phrases).  It was an effective strategic 
move, so that even when the oil crisis ended, people would associate the imports with 
more than simple fuel-efficiency, but also quality or other benefits. 
 This period was one of expansion of the imports, in terms of sales and notoriety in 
the United States.  With the increase in sales, each company also increased its advertising 
budget.  Toyota, for example, could now move to advertise across the country rather than 
just in the various regions.  Moreover, the increasing number of dealers enabled the 
companies to sell their products to the consumers without having to ship the vehicles 
from larger cities.  Perhaps most significantly, the often creative ads ensured that more 
Americans learned and were aware of what the imports had to offer – particularly Toyota, 
which soon launched some of the most effective marking in automobile history.  “Oh, 





GO: TOYOTA’S CONTINUED CLIMB TO THE TOP 
 During the post-oil embargo of 1973 the Japanese economy went through a rough 
recession that continued to plague the country through the mid-1970s.  By 1976, Japan 
was seeing some improvements and increases in exports.  In fact, exports “generated a 
Japanese trade surplus of $4.8 billion” by July 1976, which Time magazine reported led 
to “testiness among Japan’s trading partners who do not like the idea of buying so much 
more from Japan than they are selling there.”  To combat the outcries, the Japanese 
government started to allow more imports, including autos “even if they [had] met 
Japanese air-pollution standards only at the point of shipment instead of the point of 
entry.”  By doing so, European and American vehicles could more easily sell their 
vehicles in Japan.150 
 But business and economic relations between the U.S. and Japan were never 
pleasant.  Often tense, meetings between the two governments, as well as Japan and other 
Western nations, focused on the ever-growing gap of the trade.  All too frequently, the 
United States charged Japan with dumping electronics into the American and world 
market.  There was no shortage of books assessing this trade imbalance, notably U.S. 
trade negotiator Clyde Prestowitz’s best seller, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan 
to Take the Lead published in 1988.151  While not specifically regarding the trade 
imbalance between the United States and Japan, Karel Van Wolfaren’s The Enigma of 
Japanese Power (1989) and Chalmers A. Johnson’s MITI and the Japanese Miracle 
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(1982)152, represent some of the attempts to understand “Japan, Inc.” in these tumultuous 
years. 
 Toyota continued to receive glowing reviews and win awards for its cars, as sales 
climbed unceasingly.  By the end of the 1970s, Toyota was ranked at number three in the 
world behind only General Motors and Ford in total sales, and was the leader in car 
imports to the United States.  The Corolla became the most produced car in the world 
during this period.  In 1978 alone, Toyota had combined sales of over $14 billion 
worldwide.  That was a giant leap from its modest start in 1937 and its tenuous beginning 
in the United States in 1958. 
Toyota’s Vehicles 
 Through the reviews and awards, Toyota came to be recognized as more than just 
the average import by the late 1970s.  The Corolla came in two different engine sizes by 
1977 (1600cc and 1200cc) as well as different models (2-door, 4-door, wagon, and 
“Liftback”).  The Corona took over as the top family car offered by Toyota as the 
company phased out the Mark II.  The 1977 LE (luxury edition) model looked similar to 
a Mercedes Benz in design and offered a great deal of comfort.  In addition to all of the 
standards already offered on the Corona, the LE provided even more luxury, such as “an 
interior done in cut-pile carpeting, with seats and door panels covered in a velour 
corduroy fabric.”  Motor Trend judged the car’s looks and ride as smooth, but with “none 
of the vague, lack-of-control feeling that is normally associated with a ride that smooth.”  
The car could also handle speed and seemed to be “a car with a dual personality.”  The 
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1977 Corona LE was “conservatively styled, comfortable, nicely assembled, pleasant to 
drive – even in town- and move[d] fairly quickly.”153 
For a sports car model, Toyota had the Celica, which was available in three 
models in 1977: the GT liftback, GT hardtop and ST hardtop.  While not necessarily as 
sporty or famous for being a sports car (such as the Jaguar or Porsche), the Celica sold for 
significantly less than most of the other import sports models.  In fact, Motor Trend 
named the Celica Import Car of the Year for both 1976 and 1978.  The 1978 Celica that 
Motor Trend selected was the GT Liftback, a sporty-looking model that was of high 
quality in every aspect.  From the mechanical features, including “[h]andling, braking, 
acceleration, and the stick-shifting 5-speed gearbox” to the “good, sound mechanical 
features, improved gas mileage [over earlier versions], precise handling, excellent quality 
control, comfortable passenger accommodations and plenty of luggage space” the Celica 
left little to be desired.  The interior was comfortable, with great visibility, a relatively 
smooth ride and agile handing.  In fact, according to Motor Trend, the Celica was one of 
the better models in its class.  The car not only had excellent mileage, but handled well 
and predictably and was “one of the more futurist cars available for less than $30,000.”154 
Toyota also continued to sell the Land Cruiser, the vehicle that kept the company 
afloat in its early years.  Motor Trend reported on the durability of the Land Cruiser in its 
coverage of the Toyota 4WD Jamboree.  The event would run the vehicles over the 
Rubicon Springs trail in the Sierra Mountains for 175 miles.  Most of the vehicles were 
able to handle the tough trip, showing that Toyota could make tough vehicles as well.  
The course reportedly “would have wiped out the sides of a Blazer-size 4WD.”  And 
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most people who participated commented “about how tough they were, how well the 
Toyotas did.”155   
The Land Cruiser Station Wagon was a tough vehicle as well, and one reviewer 
even felt that the vehicle gave “the feeling it [could] stop a rhino or climb the vertical 
face of El Capitan.”  By 1978, Toyota sold more than half a million Land Cruisers in the 
United States.  Since the vehicle was primarily for off-roading, it had low horsepower, 
but was incredibly strong and durable, and built to last.  However, the fuel efficiency was 
low, and with increasing EPA standards, the engine needed to undergo major changes to 
meet the emissions requirements.  While the 1978 model was similar to the one from 
1972, it did include a 4-speed rather than 3-speed transmission.156 
The Toyota SR5 was a mini-pickup that got better EPA-rated mile-fuel 
consumption than its competitors.  Motor Trend noted that the SR5 had excellent brakes, 
good torque, good forward mobility, but was also loud.157  The 1978 model had a higher 
payload than the competitors (including a Ford and a Chevrolet), as well as a more 
powerful engine.158 
Overall, Toyota vehicles were average priced for imports, not the most expensive 
nor the least.  In 1977, a standard Toyota Corolla 1200cc cost $2788, while a standard 
Honda Civic went for $2779.  A more powerful Corolla, which would compete with more 
vehicles, was priced at $3208, while the cheapest Datsun, the F-10, sold for $3849.  
European models of similar size included the Fiat X 1/9 ($5195) and the Volkswagen 
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Beetle ($3599).  Even the imports sold by American companies, such as the Dodge Colt 
($2984) and the Buick Opel ($3282), sold for more than the standard Corolla.159   
Competitor Vehicles 
 In 1974, Time reported that Volkswagen lost “$313 million – more than any of the 
world’s business organizations except Britain’s government-owned National Coal 
Board.”  By 1975, the company cut some of their losses and was on the road to recovery, 
partially due to an increase in auto sales in Germany.  Beetle sales were slowing, so 
“Volkswagen and its subsidiary Audi NSU have introduced five new cars in the past 3½ 
years.”  These cars included the Rabbit, which was popular in Europe and America.  
Volkswagen’s managing director strategically shifted some of the assembling of 
Volkswagen vehicles to the United States in 1976.160  By 1979, the company developed 
plans for a second factory in the United States.  The company experienced losses to the 
Japanese companies, notably Toyota, Datsun and Honda; nonetheless, Volkswagen was 
still the fourth largest seller of imported vehicles in the U.S. with 3.4 percent of the 
market.161 
 Chrysler, like Volkswagen, also experienced losses in the mid-1970s.  Time 
reported that in 1975, the company suffered a net loss of $259 million and also lost some 
of its share of the domestic auto market, slipping from 16.6 percent to 14.9 percent in 
1975.  Part of the reason for some of their recovery in early 1976 was due to the success 
of their vehicles in the intermediate and compact categories.  These vehicles included the 
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heavily advertised Cordoba, Volare and Aspen, which accounted for about half of 
Chrysler’s sales.162 
 Sales in early 1976 were unexpectedly high for Detroit.  After the 1973 oil crisis, 
Detroit had a build-up of compacts, expecting that sales of that area would continue to 
rise.  By 1976, however, consumers shifted their interest to reportedly “larger, somewhat 
more gas-thirstier compacts and intermediates that offer a bit more leg room, somewhat 
more trunk space and in some cases even a touch of high style.”  The fear of the gas 
shortage was now far from the minds of the consumer, as subcompacts fell from a ten 
percent share of the market at the end of the oil embargo in 1974 to just 7.7 percent in 
1976.  Sales of the Chevrolet Chevette, the AMC Pacer, and imports all decreased in the 
lull after the embargo.  The largest sales increases were for the domestic compacts priced 
from $3,200 to $4,500: Chevy Novas, Ford Granadas, Dodge Aspens, and Plymouth 
Volares.  Even with these numbers, the major manufacturers still had plans to slim down 
their larger cars, especially as some executives expected that the smaller cars would 
account for almost three-quarters of the market by 1980.163  The Oldsmobile Cutlass was 
the fastest seller in the industry in early 1976, but both Ford and Chrysler continued to do 
well.  “Only American Motors, which specializ[ed] in small cars, [was] faltering” in the 
early months of 1976.164 
 Nevertheless, 1976 was a good year for sales.  In the first quarter of that year, 
General Motors reported huge profits of $800 million compared with only $59 million a 
year earlier.”  GM’s enormous success was not repeated in other companies and 
industries, but many still bounced back after the recession that rocked the country in 
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1975.  For example, Chrysler’s first quarter profits of $72.1 million contrasted sharply 
with a loss of $93.4 million in the opening three months of the previous year.165  The 
boom in sales caught Detroit off guard, and inventories dropped “to an average of 52 
days, well below the 60- to 70-day supply” that the manufactures preferred.166 
 Ford launched a new vehicle in Europe in 1976 – the Fiesta.  The much advertised 
car was not imported to America until the following year.  Before its debut, some in the 
industry worried that the Fiesta would be a repeat of the Edsel, the design and marketing 
disaster that eventually cost Ford losses estimated at $350 million, the brand name 
becoming enshrined as a byword for debacle.  By July of 1976, Ford spent $800 million 
on the Fiesta.  It would come in three versions, each with different motors.  The car itself 
was smaller than the Pinto, and the price for the standard version would put it “in direct 
competition with such popular models as the VW Rabbit, Audi 50 and Fiat 127” in 
Europe.167 
 For the 1977 models, only one American manufacturer decreased the size and 
weight of their vehicles.  General Motors “unveiled a gallery of standard-sized cars” that 
averaged nearly a foot shorter and 700 pounds lighter than comparable 1976 models.  
GM also significantly increased the prices of the cars to an average of $6,000.168  To 
increase fuel efficiency, General Motors knew that it had to make their vehicles smaller.  
The company also fine-tuned some of their technology, such as creating a devise called 
“MISAR, which monitors driving conditions and adjusts ignition-spark timing for 
optimal performances.”  Ford, on the other hand, did not decrease model sizes at that 
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time, and thus hoped to win a larger percent of the market from consumers who did not 
want to spend more money on smaller vehicles.  In 1976, import sales decreased, from 18 
percent in 1975 to only 13.6 percent by September of 1976.  It did not help imports that, 
as Time magazine put it, “nearly all the foreign automakers last spring [1976] were 
targets of complaint to the Treasury that they were dumping cars in the U.S.”  To combat 
the complaints, many of these companies raised prices.169 
 American companies continued to decrease the size of their vehicles for the 1978 
models.  For example, the Chevelle decreased by over twelve inches, lost over 800 
pounds, but managed to increase some of the room in the interior.  Even Ford now also 
decreased the size of some of its vehicles.  Foreseeing advertising problems, Ford feared 
GM vehicles would make theirs “look big and old-fashioned by comparison.”  The 
conflict in marketing goals started according to Motor Trend because “Ford didn’t cut the 
exterior length of its new compacts, while in fact increasing interior dimensions 
significantly.  At the same time, GM was reducing some of the interior dimensions on its 
new compacts.”170 
 Among imports, Nissan, under the Datsun line, attempted to attack Toyota from a 
number of fronts with different models. Two Datsun models, the 510 and the 200-SX, 
would be in direct competition with Toyota, while the 810 and 280-Z were set against 
European vehicles.  The 280-Z was considered to be one of the best sports cars available, 
while the 510 was one of the best vehicles in its price category.  The B-210 series was a 
direct competitor for the Toyota Corolla; nonetheless, the Toyota still sold better.  For 
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example, in December 1977, Toyota sold 17,500 Corollas, while Datsun sold 12,500 B-
210s.171 
 Honda had two cars available in the United States during this period, the Civic 
and the Accord.  The Civic was increasingly popular in America, and came equipped 
with the CVCC engine, and a number of different versions: hatchback, wagon, and two-
door.  The Accord was available with “a high level of standard equipment and some 
clever gimmickry – reminder lights that pop on whenever certain maintenance functions 
are due, and a little lighted diagram that shows if a door or the hatch is ajar or a stop light 
is out.”172  Considering that these gadgets were not standard on most competitor models, 
Honda seemed ahead of the time. 
 Not all competitor vehicles were well built or safe.  In the case of Ford, the Pinto 
model pulled them into a court case.  In June of 1978, the company recalled the models 
built between 1971 and 1976.  But an Indiana court put Ford on trial for reckless 
homicide in the deaths of three girls who died in August 1978 when a Pinto erupted into 
flames.  The court argued that the case should continue because Ford allowed to car to 
remain on the highways despite knowing about defect.173  
 According to a report issued by the Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI), 
subcompacts had the worst coverage losses in collisions in 1978.  Of the ten worst on the 
list, five were imports including the Toyota Celica, The Toyota Corolla, the Datsun 200-
SX, and the Datsun 280Z.  Other vehicles included the Chevrolet Corvette, the Pontiac 
Firebird and the Chevrolet Camaro.  Of the ten best cars, all were domestic, some 
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compacts and others intermediate, including the Buick Skylark, Chevrolet Nova, Dodge 
Aspen and Plymouth Volare.174 
 The Chrysler Company was in trouble in mid-to-late 1979.  Because of the 
company’s smaller size and earlier commitment to larger vehicles, Chrysler could not 
retool their vehicles as quickly as Ford and GM to meet the demands of consumers, who 
increasingly desired smaller vehicles.  The company’s sales dropped dramatically, down 
13.4 percent in the first five months of 1979, a $53.8 million loss in the first quarter.  Add 
to that the devastating losses of $204.6 million from 1978 and it is easy to see why the 
company was worried.  Chrysler also had the oldest plants and highest costs of the Big 
Three, making modernization an additional problem.  Even with a relatively long 
warranty (5-year, 50,000 miles), the company could not move its vehicles off the lots.  
The only cars that sold well, the Omni and Horizon, suffered from limited production due 
to the contract with Volkswagen to make only 300,000 engines a year.  The government, 
however, did allow Chrysler to buy new emission and seat-belt systems from General 
Motors.175 
 By July of 1979, Chrysler was doing no better.  Chairman John Riccardo 
informed the U.S. government that without aid, the company would no longer be a major 
force in the economy.  This news was startling because Chrysler was the tenth largest 
industrial company in the nation.  Sales for Chrysler were off 16.9 percent, while Ford 
was similarly down 16.2 percent even as GM decreased only 5.3 percent.  Already 
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sapped by meeting both emissions and safety standards, Chrysler was in debt by $1.2 
billion.176  Chrysler request to the government was for a tax refund equal to what the 
company would have paid in taxes if not for all of the losses.177  In December, Congress 
voted to approve a loan guarantee, with stipulations that Chrysler must raise $2 billion on 
its own, as well as cut future benefits and pay for the workers.178 
 To aid consumers who wanted to make a fuel-efficient purchase in 1980, Motor 
Trend published a list of 136 different vehicles that would be available in the United 
States along with their estimated mile-per-gallon rating.  At the top of the list were the 
VW Rabbit (41 mpg) and the VW Dasher (36 mpg), followed by the Datsun 210 (35 
mpg).  The Toyota Corolla Tercel came in seventh with a rating of 31 miles per gallon.  
While both Dodge and Plymouth technically had cars in the top five, these two vehicles 
were actually built by Mitsubishi, another foreign company.  The first true American-
made vehicle did not appear until number ten, the Chevrolet Chevette, at 29 miles per 
gallon.  The lowest ranking Toyotas, the Corona and the Cressida, both with 18 miles per 
gallon, were ranked at 96 and 97 respectively, although many other vehicles averaged 18 
mpg as well.  The vehicles listed at the very bottom of the list, all with less than 15 miles 
per gallon, were mostly luxury or sports vehicles, made by companies like BMW, Jaguar, 
Porsche or Rolls Royce.179 
Sales of smaller vehicles increased during 1979 especially for imports, as some of 
the Detroit vehicles were still large and burned too much fuel.  Toyotas and Volkswagens 
sold well, with total import sales nearing a quarter of the American market.  Sales of 
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GM’s new line of X car, as well as the Ford Thunderbird, Mark V, and Cougar all 
decreased.  GM’s overall sales even on the standard Chevrolet were down twenty percent 
from January.  On the bottom end, sales of the Ford Cougar were the lowest, with fewer 
than a paltry 3,000 sold in the first six months of 1979 contrasted with 18,775 in the same 
period of 1978.180 
Protecting the Environment 
 1975 was the original cut-off year for the new standards on automobile emissions 
in the United States.  Yet, American manufactures still managed to push the deadline 
back a number of times, from 1976 to 1978.  In the early months of 1977, the American 
automobile industry looked to be in dire trouble.  Their vehicles were not going to meet 
the standards for 1978, but Congress had yet to grant them an extension.  Congress 
erupted into an argument, with Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Maine) leading the outcry 
against Detroit manufacturers.  He claimed that they were stalling, despite the fact that 
almost everyone agreed that the standards set for 1978 were too stringent for the 
companies to meet.181  Even Honda’s progressive CVCC engine would not be enough to 
meet the stricter standards in years to come.182 
 The majority of manufacturers in the industry decided to use the catalytic 
converter to meet the emissions standards.  Much less expensive than redesigning 
engines, catalytic converters merely “remove pollutants from exhaust after it leaves the 
engine but before it blows out of the tailpipe.” The ones the companies were using in 
1976 would not meet the standards required in 1978.  To meet the new standards, Time 
magazine reported, “carmakers [would] have to resort to lower combustion temperatures, 
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reduced compression ratios and other engine modifications.”  All of these changes would 
decrease fuel efficiency, the companies argued.183 
 In early 1976, both the California EPA and the Federal EPA fined American 
manufacturers.  The California EPA, known for setting the tone for standards, went after 
American Motors for $4.3 million while also banning sales of the company’s Gremlins, 
Matadors and Hornets with 304-cubic-inch V8 engines.  The board accused A.M.C. of 
“producing polluting cars and submitting reports that falsely showed they met California 
standards.”  The Federal EPA “asked for a fine of $420,000” on forty-two 1974 Valiants 
and Darts from Chrysler that “were equipped with combinations of emission-control 
equipment not certified by EPA.”184 
 The EPA announced tougher standards in late 1978 for the 1981 vehicles.  Time 
reports that these standards allocated “the allowable level of evaporated hydrocarbon 
emissions at 2.0 grams, replacing the current standard of 6.0 grams with the 1978 
models.”  The cost to meet these new standards would “run approximately $1 to $5.50 
per car, and there will be no effect on fuel consumption or maintenance.”185 
Other Government Measures 
 The United States government did not just limit emissions on the automobiles.  
Safety continued to be a feature that the government pushed, as well as fuel economy and 
efficiency.  One of the first measures was a national highway speed limit of 55-mph.  But 
Congress also imposed gas economy standards of 27.5 mpg average for the entire fleet by 
1985, a sixty-five percent increase over the average of 17.6 mpg for the 1976 models.  
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This move forced the American manufacturers to “steadily trim car size and weight” to 
meet these standards.186 
 During the Ford Administration, the U.S. government continued to enact new 
laws and restrictions concerning safety.  One of the first challenges was the issue of air 
bags.  The Secretary of Transportation William T. Coleman, who pushed for the bags as 
early as 1976, said that while he believed air bags worked, “they cannot be imposed 
instantly on people.”  Instead, he “asked the car companies to outfit 500,000 cars with air 
bags during the [1977-79] model years, in what would amount to a mass test.”  His order 
ended a seven-year conflict between some insurance companies and Ralph Nader on one 
hand, and automakers on the other.  At the time, consumers did not want to purchase 
vehicles with air bags.  Indeed, consumers purchased only 11,000 GM models with air 
bags as an option.  Time magazine’s analysis of the problem reported that air bags “are 
most effective in frontal crashes taking place at less than 30 m.p.h…. are not effective in 
side swipes, back-end collisions, or multiple jolts” and moreover, often did not work and 
would inflate and startle the driver.187  To pay for the new devices, consumers would be 
responsible for pay $38 million of the $86 million required to institute the program.  
Motor Trend estimated the individual cost to be $100 for full front-seat air bags and $50 
for driver-side only.188 
 When Joan Claybrook took over as the head of the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA), she immediately launched a massive recall campaign.  
In 1977 alone, the organization recalled over 12 million vehicles.  While only one of the 
combined recall campaigns (195 domestic and 49 foreign models) in the United States 
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was from a direct government order, many came from direct pressure from the NHTSA.  
Significantly, a Supreme Court ruling allowed the government to order “recalls without 
having to prove that the defect in question has caused, or will cause, a significant number 
of accidents, injuries or deaths.”189 
The Continued Struggle with Oil 
Oil continued to be a problem area, although for the years between the first and 
second oil crises which book ended the decade, prices did stabilize.  Despite the 
normalization of prices, however, the possibility of another crisis and shortage was 
always hanging over the heads of both the consumers and manufacturers.  Between 1971 
and 1975, officials predicted shortages for each winter.   
Consumers, in the years just after the 1973 oil crisis, seemed to ignore and even 
forget the hardships incurred that winter.  Though it seems astonishing, by the 
presidential election of 1976, only 2 percent of the voting population regarded energy “as 
the most pressing national problem.”  Yet, since the end of the Arab oil embargo in 1974, 
the country’s dependence on foreign sources increased.  In July 1976, America imported 
41 percent of its oil whereas before the embargo the country imported only 29 percent.  
The suppliers also changed, as both Canada and Venezuela cut back their exports, forcing 
the U.S. to turn to Arab countries.  Compounding the problem, the United States did not 
invest much in alternative sources, unlike the Japanese who by 1976 began working on 
nuclear and geothermal power.190 
For the first week of December 1976, the price per gallon of regular gas in the 
United States averaged 58 cents.  In Japan, a gallon would cost $1.34 (US) and some 
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European countries had even higher prices!  As Time magazine reported in an expose 
entitled “Fiddling Dangerously While Fuel Burns,” an increase on the price of oil by the 
OPEC nations would harm production in all nations.  Yet, most governments still had not 
enacted strict conservation policies, the United States and Japan included.  In fact, in 
1975, the United States “consumed exactly as much energy for each dollar of G.N.P. as it 
did in the embargo year of 1973.”  Indeed, by December of 1976, the U.S. consumed oil 
as 47.2 percent of all energy, up from the 1973 figure of 46.7 percent.191 
By the first week of February 1979 the oil problem was in full swing.  The Iranian 
oilfield strike started in October 1978, meaning that Iran pumped virtually no crude oil 
between October 1978 and March 1979.  In a strange turn of events, as Time reported, 
“the U.S. faced the bizarre situation of having to rush an emergency shipment of 200,000 
barrels of diesel fuel and gasoline to Iran because local refinery output [was] insufficient 
to meet domestic needs.”  While the U.S. did not depend on Iran for most of its oil (only 
five percent at the time), other countries such as Japan, Western Europe and Israel did 
depend on Iran.  Other OPEC members, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Nigeria, increased 
production, but it was still not enough to meet the demands for all countries; the situation 
was further aggravated by low oil reserves in most countries.  For the U.S., by February 
1979, reserves were ten percent lower than they had been the previous year.192 
By March, four major oil companies, Exxon, Texaco, Phillips Petroleum and 
Shell, cut their supplies and started to ration fuel shipments.  Some gas stations across the 
country started to cut back on their hours or limited fuel sales.  The price of a barrel 
doubled from December to March to $22, and members of OPEC planned for more price 
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increases throughout the year.193  By the first week of April 1979, the cost of a barrel of 
crude oil was now $14.55, as compared with the 1973 price of $2.41 or the 1978 price of 
$12.70.  In 1973, a gallon of gas cost an average of 37.3 cents.  By 1977 it was 61.6 cents 
and 1978 64.9 cents.  For the first three months of 1979, the average prices were 68.2 
cents, 69.8 cents and 72.8 cents respectively.194 
Remarkably many consumers still did not believe there was a true crisis, and 
instead blamed greedy oil companies for the price increases.  Many of the companies did 
show an increase in profits, and prices did rise, but their earnings would increase only 
with price increases.  In fact, overall, the oil companies did not earn as much on their 
revenues as all U.S. industries (4.5 percent vs. 5.25 percent).  It was OPEC that caused 
the price jumps, with the price of oil increasing 14.5 percent between January and early 
May 1979.  With the U.S. dependent on OPEC nations for some 50 percent of its oil, any 
move by the cartel would influence overall prices and availability in the country.  To 
make matters worse, the different types of crude oil could not be processes by every 
refinery.  So, oil from Nigeria that was high quality could not be processed in a plant 
built to deal with the petroleum from Kuwait, which was heavier.  Add to that an increase 
in demand by five percent from 1978 levels, and the crisis would only become worse.  
And while OPEC controlled 58 percent of the world’s oil (actually a decrease from 65 
percent in 1973), their supplies were necessary for a number of countries, including Japan 
and the United States.195 
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By mid-May, many gas stations across the country began to shorten their hours, 
including closing on weekends, some even limiting the amount of gas a customer could 
buy.  Oil companies had to limit their supplies to the gas stations, making the end of the 
month prime time for stations to be out of gas.  While Iran resumed some of its exports, 
other OPEC nations cut their exports even farther to keep the market tight and drive up 
prices.  With new drivers and more vehicles on the road, including some gas guzzlers like 
Jeeps or campers, gasoline sales only increased further.  Even with the increase in more 
fuel-efficient vehicles, the average mile per gallon for all passenger cars in the U.S. only 
increased by half a mile, to 14.35 mpg.196 
To combat the shortages, some states enacted the odd-even method of gasoline 
allocation.  Further aggravating problems, the DOE ordered oil companies to begin 
stockpiling oil for winter heating rather than using it then for gasoline.  The continued 
increase on the price of oil only hiked inflation, by some estimates around 2.5 percent in 
1979 alone.  Members of OPEC did not seem to want to increase production either, 
realizing that a limited supply would be in their favor.197  In July, members of OPEC 
increased prices again, so that the average price per barrel was $20 to $21, up 15 percent 
from the first week of July, 50 percent since the start of 1979, and an amazing 1,000 
percent higher than the price of $1.80 at the start of the 1970s. 198   
In late October, more nations again increased the price of their crude oil.  Iraq, 
Libya and Iran increased their prices by 10 percent, following an announcement by 
Mexico to increase prices as well.  These prices broke through the $23.50199 per barrel 
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limit set in June that was supposed to last until the end of the year.  One Saudi official 
told the U.S. government that the only way to stop the price increases would be to curb 
oil use and demand.  Some oil countries decided to end their contracts and sell their oil on 
the spot, which would give them more money as the market prices were higher than what 
OPEC set for prices.200 
Just when consumers thought that the situation could not get any worse, Iranian 
militants took over of the U.S. embassy, which stimulated further increases in oil prices.  
The hostage situation triggered fears in the U.S. and around the world about the price of 
gas, as well as the value of the U.S. currency.  Indeed, gas prices only continued to rise in 
the United States, to a national average of $1.01201 by November 1979.  Iran declared that 
the U.S. could not buy Iranian crude oil, nor could anyone else deliver their oil to the 
United States.  While the U.S. still did not depend on Iran for most of its oil, any decrease 
in the already strained imports further aggravated the problem.202  In December, Saudi 
Arabia increased prices, this time by 33 percent, taking its price from $18 to $24 per 
barrel.  Other nations, such as Venezuela, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates followed 
suit.203   
Toyota’s Print Advertisements and Marketing Strategies 
 Most of Toyota’s print advertisements during this difficult era looked similar to 
each other and played along a similar theme.  The top half of the ad would have some 
slogan, generally accompanied by, “You Asked For It,” while the bottom half would 
feature the vehicle.  Often these ads would have multiple versions, some one page, others 
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running for multiple pages and highlighting more and more features.  Significantly, these 
multiple-page ads showed the increase in Toyota’s advertising budget, which displayed 
their increased profits.  Only a company that was so successful could afford extravagant 
ad displays.  While later ads dropped the “You asked for it” part of the slogan, they 
always included some headline (“One reason why the Corolla is the world’s most popular 
car”) and would end with the “You Got it.”  Part of the reason for this campaign’s 
success was that the ads paraded as informational, providing plenty of text material to 
“support” the claims of the slogan.  The main terms were in bold print, making the ads 
easier to read even for the casual observer. 
 By the time the second oil crisis hit in the country in 1979, Toyota had already 
established itself as a viable alternative to the American manufactured vehicles.  With the 
shortage of oil and rising gasoline prices, Toyota seemed an even better alternative, as 
Toyota had a number of fuel-efficient vehicles already available for consumers. 
 In 1976, Motor Trend selected the Toyota Celica as Import Car of the Year.  
Toyota advertising emphasized this award, even including quotes from the magazine.  In 
fact, one of the excerpts mentions the quality of Toyota vehicles: “so although this award 
is for the 1976 Celica line, it is also recognition of the quality of all those that have gone 
before.”  Toyota even offered, for a limited time of course, plaques with the vehicle that 
would be customized with the owners name to commemorate the award and purchase.   
 Another 1976 advertisement “explained” what Toyota meant when it said that 
their vehicles were the better bargain.  The better bargain was quality, 1976 prices, 
economy (most likely fuel), and the top seller.  By quality, Toyota meant that its vehicles 




sold in America are still on the road today.”  A great feat indeed for vehicles sold in 1958 
to still be in use!  Toyotas, according to the ad, were cheaper both in price (which was at 
the 1976 not 1977 price), as well as in operating costs, yet also commanded a high resale 
value.  Toyota even told consumers, “If you can find a better built small car or truck than 
a Toyota…buy it.”  And what happened?  Toyota’s sales increased.  Consumers judged 
that Toyota was obviously the better bargain, as who wouldn’t want a car that would 
operate years down the road? 
 Toyota Corollas were full of quality, according to the different 1976 
advertisements.  “Quality.  You Asked For It.”  But what does quality mean?  Well, to 
Toyota, it meant inexpensive but not cheap.  It meant quality in the entire line, not just 
the individual car, so all of the different lines of Corolla – the light back or the sport 
coupe – were quality.  Quality meant fuel-efficiency, 39 highway and 24 city; it meant 
good handling, durability, convenience, reclining seats and lots of fresh air from the 
vents.   
 A 1979 ad boldly exclaimed, “Don’t waste gas” and then proceeded to detail the 
benefits of owning a Toyota, with the feature vehicle being the Corolla.  The ad 
highlighted the fact that Toyota met the EPA 1979 standards, averaged 31 mpg in the city 
(40 on the highway), with “minimum maintenance.”  What is minimum maintenance?  
Toyota explained that since their “engines energize every drop of fuel so cleanly and 
efficiently, you don’t have the dirty problems of lead salts cutting into and eroding the 
guts of your engine.”  Not only that, but the Corolla was one of the lowest priced cars in 
America, at $3,748 (not including tax, transportation, California emissions or optional 




Toyota had 37 different models available! The informational text closed with, “When you 
got it, you got it,” but does not explain what “it” is.  
Competitor Print Advertisements 
 In the dark days of the 1979 oil crisis, many companies promoted their fuel-
efficient vehicles, often comparing their model with competitors.  One of the most 
humorous of this type of ad came from Subaru.  One 1979 ad featured a quartet of 
African-American men in tuxedoes, reminiscent of The Temptations, with a Subaru in the 
background behind them.  The headline read, “The Cadillacs drive Subaru.”  Reading the 
text, one learns that “The Cadillacs” was the name of this musical group.  The print 
explained all of the great features of the Subaru, the rack and pinion steering, steel belted 
radials, high mile per gallon ratings, and a low price.  In fact, “Subaru is built to become 
a golden oldie.”  A similar ad declared “Take it from a Ford, drive a Subaru.”  The 
picture featured a woman, named Susan Ford, standing in front of her Subaru, pointing a 
finger at the viewer.  And what does Susan know?  Well, Susan was a photographer, and 
she depended on her Subaru to take her as she went “barnstorming around the country.”  
She knew that her Subaru was tough enough to handle the job.  Both ads played on well-
known American car companies, twisting them to fit into Subaru’s favor.  A casual reader 
would notice the pictures, as well as the bold text and wonder why a Ford or a Cadillac 
would support some tiny import.  The print was chatty, but also explanatory, and the use 
of humor was sure to draw attention to the company.  Subaru’s slogan highlighted two 
important features for the slumping American economy, price and longevity.  “Subaru: 





 Volkswagen’s slogan during the 1979 crisis, “Volkswagen does it again,” was not 
as effective without the context of their ads.  Even within their ads, Volkswagen did not 
explain what exactly they do again, but the reader can only assume that it has something 
to do with their success with the iconic Beetle.  These ads featured the Volkswagen 
Rabbit Diesel, which according to government estimates, was the most fuel-efficient car 
on the market.  Naturally, one ad highlighted that feature.  What appear to be clippings of 
newspaper headlines dominated the top of the ad, with the text “First the bad news” 
above them.  And what was the bad news?  The rising cost of oil and gasoline shortages, 
of course.  Below these clippings, Volkswagen placed their car and the text “Now the 
good news,” emphasizing the car’s incredible ratings of 40 mpg in the city and 50 mpg 
on the highway.  And if you drove a Rabbit, the ad punned, “You’d have ‘em over a 
barrel.”  Another ad showed a man getting into his Volkswagen, with snow piled all over 
the yard, car and house.  The print explained, “How does the man who drives the 
snowplow drive to the snowplow?”  With a Volkswagen Rabbit of course!  The Rabbit 
not only started easy in the winter, but was also highly maneuverable even in bad 
weather.  Moreover, the Rabbit was the only car in its class with such excellent 
capabilities.  A third ad following this format showed a man running, with a Volkswagen 
Rabbit Diesel pulling ahead of him.  The catch?  “It can run a mile cheaper than you 
can.”  The text explained, using math, that the Rabbit Diesel burned about 1.4 cents 
worth of fuel for a mile, while the average human would need around 18 cents worth of 
food to go the same distance.  “Fact is, if you were a car, you couldn’t afford you.”  Not 
only was it fuel-efficient, the Rabbit didn’t need conventional tune-ups because it didn’t 




low price and such amazing fuel-efficiency, “what you save with a Rabbit Diesel, can 
fuel you with steak.” 
 One Buick ad for their LeSabre 4-door proclaimed, “If one of these looks good to 
you, one of these should look terrific.”  The company listed five imports, the Toyota 
Cressida, VW Dasher, Datsun 810, Audi 5000 and the Volvo 244, all with similar prices 
and mpg ratings.  However, the LeSabre was the cheapest of all of those listed, advertised 
at $6110, and held more passengers (six) than the competition.  But the ad does not 
highlight any other features that set the LeSabre apart from the competition, nor does it 
mention any extras available.  The slogan is equally underplayed, “After all, life is to 
enjoy.”  The ad does not explain how their vehicle would make life enjoyable, other than 
by saving the consumer some money up front, but that information must be inferred by 
the consumer. 
 Chrysler’s ad for its corporation played on its fuel-efficiency versus its American 
competitors.  Chrysler had twelve vehicles available with 25 or more estimated mpg 
ratings, while GM only had four and Ford merely had one.  The text even stated that 
Chrysler had four models that beat GM’s best car, and four that topped the lonely Ford, 
and twelve models that beat all of the new “X” cars by GM.  The ad then listed the 
vehicles that were rated higher than imports, including the gasoline-powered VW Rabbit, 
and the Toyota Celica.  “Nobody has more 30 est. mpg gas models than Chrysler,” the ad 
reminded.  Chrysler’s slogan for this ad even highlighted their fuel-efficiency, “Chrysler 
Corporation.  No. 1 in gas mileage of the Big 3.”  The ad failed to mention price, 






 While some import sales dropped before the second oil crisis hit in 1979, Toyota 
managed to capture a large share of the American market, easing into the third spot even 
before the crisis began.  Toyota’s ads do not draw attention to their impressive jump in 
the American market, however, and instead continue to focus on the specific benefits of 
owning a Toyota.  The company did note, often with glee, their awards and the overall 
efficiency of their products.  Their slogan during this period, “You got it,” was not as 
effective or memorable as others, but the company used this phrase as a jumping point to 
highlight various features of their cars, or line of cars. 
 By the end of the 1970’s, Toyota was poised to continue its rise, hoping even to 
overtake Ford.  Toyota was well known and recognized, a far cry from its position just 
twenty years earlier.  In 1958, or 1965, and even 1970 to a lesser degree, few people took 
the company seriously.  Some regarded Toyota, and most imports, as a fad, or as just a 
small portion of the market, even as late as the conclusion of the first oil crisis.  But by 
1979, Toyota was one of the major competitors in the market, and their cars were 
recognized for both quality and value.  Detroit could no longer ignore them or dismiss the 
company as a small threat.  Even among other imports, Toyota vehicles received notice, 
and some scorn.  Companies would want to emulate Toyota’s success, although by 1979, 
it was too late for many manufacturers.  Toyota established its reputation and proved that 





GROWTH: TOYOTA’S RISE TO NUMBER 2 
 By the end of 1979, Toyota was already the third largest automobile manufacturer 
in the world.  Combined with product design, technology and proven reliability, their 
strategic advertising campaigns paid off, and the goals set forth in the beginning by the 
Toyoda family enabled the company to build cars that the public desired.  Aiding the 
company was the failure of the American manufacturers to respond to external threats, 
including safety, protecting the environment, and most importantly gas shortages.  Toyota 
struggled to build brand loyalty in the early years of production, both in Japan and 
America, and the hard work paid off with increasing sales and continuous awards. 
 Toyota’s growth is reflected in its developments in the 1980s and 1990s.  In 1985, 
Toyota reached its 20 millionth cumulative export.  In 1986, Toyota produced its 50 
millionth vehicle in Japan, and in 1999 the company hit 100 million while annual 
overseas sales were at 3 million.  One of the most successful vehicles ever produced, the 
Toyota Celica Camry (now Camry) launched in 1980.  Since 1980, the company 
introduced several new vehicles, and two new lines of vehicles.  The company also 
launched the Lexus line in 1989 to break into the American luxury market, which was a 
successful move on their part.  While not yet available in Japan, the company plans to 
launch models to compete the with European luxury vehicles already available.  More 
recent vehicles include some gasoline-electric hybrids, such as the Prius and Highlander.  
The Scion, which is growing in popularity, and was launched to appeal to the new 
generation of buyers, Generation Y.  This model is easily customizable and features add-




 Extending strategic global expansion, since 1980, the company built a number of 
plants worldwide, including some in the United States and Canada.  Their first plant 
outside of Japan, a joint venture with GM, opened in California.  By 1987, another plant, 
this time without the help of GM, was open in Kentucky and producing cars, especially 
the popular Camry model.  In that first year alone, Toyota sold around 187,000 
Camrys.204   
 Toyota’s advertising has remained strong through the years.  Building upon the 
decades of strategic success, the company has continued to run memorable, popular and 
successful campaigns, starting with the “Oh, What a Feeling” for their 1980 line.  Then in 
1986, the company launched the slogan “Who could ask for anything more?”  By 1990, 
Toyota moved to their famous “I love what you do for me” theme.  Since 1998, the 
company has moved from “Toyota|Everyday” to “Get the Feeling,” and finally, “Moving 
Forward.” 
 Since the fiscal year 2003, Toyota’s global sales have grown by around 10 percent 
a year.205  Significantly, the company also plans to build a plant in Russia, the first 
Japanese company to do so.206  Toyota has two new plants opening in 2006, one in the 
United States.  Another plant should open in 2008 in Canada, bringing the total number 
in North America to seven.207  Since 1991, Toyota has increased the number of vehicles 
built in the North America to match the number sold.  Many of the models are produced 
in the United States, including the popular Camry, Corolla and Tacoma lines.  As of 
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2003, several models are produced solely in Japan, and several only in America. Of the 
models the company makes, several are familiar from the early beginnings: the Land 
Cruiser, the Crown (although in different models), the Corolla, the Celica.208 
Moreover, Toyota’s global company is active in a number of different non-
automotive enterprises. The Toyota Company is still more than just an automobile 
manufacturer, with branches working in electronics, mechatronics, and even textile 
machinery.  Toyota remains both innovative and active in the community.  Toyota was 
one of the major sponsors of the 2005 Aichi Expo, a World Fair exhibition.  The 
company is even sponsoring research into the use of wind power, establishing Vestech 
Japan Corporation to represent Vestas Wind Systems A/S and their interests in Japan.209  
Furthermore, Toyota is moving into robotics, and the company has opened a division 
inside their company for that purpose.210 
In the United States, Toyota USA donated over $7.5 million for relief in the Gulf 
Coast after the devastating hurricanes in September 2005.211  The company annually 
donates money to education, including scholarships, teaching exchange programs, grants 
for math and science teachers, and summer youth studies. The company’s guiding 
principles state that they will “dedicate [themselves] to providing clean and safe products 
and to enhancing the quality of life everywhere.”212  The vision statement for Toyota 
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Motor Sales U.S.A. is “[t]o be the most successful and respected car company in 
America.”213 
 Currently, Toyota is the number two automobile manufacturer in the world.  
Recent negative developments at General Motors have only served to increase Toyota’s 
standing and popularity.  Besides having a poor product reputation, GM experienced poor 
sales, massive profit losses and planned layoffs unprecedented in corporate history, 
making Toyota appear as an even better option in the global market.  In the summer of 
2005, Toyota announced that it might take measures to increase its prices in order to aid 
the floundering US industry.  According to the Asahi Shimbun, one of the leading 
newspapers in Japan, Toyota planned to increase prices in the United States by two to 
three percent.214  In August of 2004, Toyota was one of the Ten Most Valuable Brands in 
the World, worth $22.67 billion, and ranked above all but eight other companies. 
 Toyota is even planning to enter vehicles into Nascar’s elite races, the Nextel Cup 
and Busch Series.  Indeed, this will make Toyota “the first foreign-owned manufacturer 
to race in Nascar's premier series since Jaguar in the 1950's.”  In an interview, an 
executive for Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., said “‘There's 75 million fans, and Toyota 
wants to be a part of the culture of this country. And in order to do that, you have to be in 
the premier auto racing series.’" 215 
In the past year alone, both General Motors and Ford have announced a series of 
plant closings and reduction in their production.  In November 2005, General Motors 
announced the closing of several plants and a total cutback of 30,000 positions.  The 
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company hopes “to achieve much of the job reduction via attrition and early retirement 
programs.”  It is part of their “four-point plan to return the company to profitability and 
long-term growth,”216 which involves health-care reduction costs, as well as what they 
call a “product renaissance.”  Their plan also calls for a reevaluation of their advertising 
to target new buyers.  The company also stressed the success of the advertisements for 
Chevrolet, which “[addressed] segment-leading fuel economy, safety and product 
quality.”217  On March 26, 2006, the GM offered severance packages to some 113,000 
workers in an effort to cut back on labor costs. 
 Ford announced similar cutbacks in January 2006.  The company plans to close 
fourteen plants, both stamping and assembly plants, and cut between 25,000 to 30,000 
jobs.  The closings should cut around a quarter of Ford’s production.  In the wake of their 
closings and cutting jobs, Ford announced a new recovery plan.  Their plan, entitled 
“Way Forward,” is designed to slow their rate of loss in the market by focusing on the 
consumer’s needs.  Mark Fields, a Ford executive vice president, stated that a 
clear view of the customer and our brands also improves product quality, as well as the  
 
quality of the selling process with straightforward pricing that is clear and simple. 
It leads to improvements in our cost structure and capacity. And it will unlock the 
talents and energy of the entire Ford team through bold leadership. 
 
This “bold leadership” plan calls for being straightforward and “acting like a smaller, 
more agile company.” 218 
In one recent release, Ford and General Motors were shown to be continuing to 
lose to the Japanese automobile industry, especially Toyota and Nissan.  In fact, the 
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import market increased to 43% of the total American market in 2005, with Toyota and 
Nissan making large gains (8.7% and 8.5% respectively).219  In December 2005, 
Edmund.com reported that the Big Three together spent $2.7 billon on various types of 
consumer incentives.  By great contrast, the Japanese industry spent only $496 million.220  
It is interesting to examine these numbers, as it shows that the Big Three seem to be using 
various types of monetary benefits to draw in customers.  By giving so many rebates or 
allowing higher cash back incentives, these companies hope to draw in new clients.  
Unfortunately, their vehicles remained the same, and the companies still lost profits in the 
long term.  While they increased traffic at the end of the year with special sales, the 
domestic companies still continued to lose in the overall market. 
Some of the trends from 2005 include a continued decrease in domestic 
manufacturers’ market share.  Specifically, Toyota and Nissan gained ground in 
comparison with other brands.221  In 2005, for the second time since it’s founding, Toyota 
Motor Sales, USA reported sales of 2,260,296 vehicles, for an increase of 10.1% in 
overall sales from 2004.  The Camry remains the best-selling car for the eighth time in 
nine years, and the fourth year in a row. Toyota’s luxury brand, Lexus, reported sales of 
over 300,000 vehicles, making it the sixth consecutive year that Lexus was America’s 
top-selling luxury car.222 
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As of the new century, Toyota ranks as the second largest automobile company in 
the world, only behind the ailing General Motors.  Only recently did Toyota manage to 
surpass Ford to take the number two spot.  According to 2004 sales, the Toyota Camry is 
the third largest seller under light vehicles, and the largest under the category of cars in 
the United States.223  Even more startling for Detroit, a 2006 ranking of vehicles by 
Consumer Reports of the ten best vehicles does not list a single American model.  In fact, 
all ten are Japanese made, with two being from Toyota.  In another ranking of the ten 
hottest cars in America, Toyota took six of the ten spots.  This ranking, by Edmunds.com, 
examined “actual selling prices closest to the vehicle's full sticker price; lowest amounts 
in rebates or other sales incentives; shortest times spent on dealer lots before being 
snapped up by buyers.”224 
With gas prices on the rise again, the American consumer is continuously looking 
for vehicles that are fuel-efficient, reliable and affordable.  Toyota, having vehicles that 
are not only fuel-efficient, but hybrids as well, will surely continue to increase their 
profits.  It will be interesting to see how these new developments continue to change the 
automobile industry.  One gets the feeling that Sakichi, Kiichiro, and Eiji Toyoda would 
be astonished, but only momentarily, at such monumental success.  After all, Toyota’s 
inspiring vision continually provided the company with the means and drive necessary to 
succeed.  Who could ask for anything more? 
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APPENDIX B: TOYOTA’S ADVERTISING SLOGANS 
1967  Get your hands on a Toyota . . . you’ll never let go.  
1970s  We’re quality oriented. 
1972  See how much car your money can buy. 
1974  Small car specialists for 40 years. 
1976  You asked for it, you got it. 
1980  Oh, What a feeling! 
1986  Who could ask for anything more? 
1990  I love what you do for me. 
1998  Toyota|Everyday 
2001           Get the Feeling  
2004  Moving Forward 
 
 
 
